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This study demonstrates that tactical nuclear weapons occupied a central and essential 
role in US military policy for confronting the Peoples Republic of China between 1950 and 
1963.  Historians seldom look at tactical nuclear weapons as a separate and distinct component 
of American foreign policy and generally place these weapons as a subset of a strategic doctrine 
directed at the Soviet Union.  When examined as a separate component of military policy, 
however, tactical nuclear weapons proved to be indispensable tools for the American leadership 
to deal with the complex relationship between the United States, the People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of China (Taiwan).  Such weapons allowed each of the three administrations 
examined in this study (Harry Truman’s, Dwight Eisenhower’s and John Kennedy’s) to commit 
the United States to defense obligations that would otherwise have been impossible.  As these 
weapons developed from their infancy in the late 1940s through a number of aggressive field 
deployments in the 1950s, US presidents repeatedly turned to tactical nuclear weapons when 
considering their military options for confronting China.  The role of tactical nuclear weapons 
strengthened with each passing presidency and with each crisis between China and the United 
States.  From these crises, tactical nuclear weapons evolved from inefficient weapons systems of 
Korean War policy, to a key element of a defensive military policy to contain China, and, in their 
final iteration, as an instrument that not only to assured containment, but was also considered as 
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 Between 1950 and 1963, the United States considered using nuclear weapons against the 
People’s Republic of China no less than eight times.  The conditions behind these considerations 
ranged from the Korean War, two Taiwan Straits crises, contingency planning for expected 
crises to pre-emptive action against Chinese nuclear weapons development facilities.  Each and 
every one of these considerations involved planning for using tactical nuclear weapons against 
China. 
 This study will demonstrate that tactical nuclear weapons evolved to become an essential 
instrument of American policy for containing China.  U.S. presidents identified a clear 
distinction between tactical weapons and their strategic counterparts and worked to use that 
distinction to their advantage in maintaining the alliances required to contain the People’s 
Republic of China.  This distinct role for tactical nuclear weapons helped to maintain a level of 
prestige for the American military, which US policymakers felt was necessary in order to 
preserve the alliance system in Asia. 
 A considerable historiography centered on nuclear weapons has already been written, but 
much of it places nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence theory, war avoidance and 
mutually assured destruction.1  Other interpretations have been devoted to debating the role of 
                                                          
1 Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3-12.  The utilization of nuclear weapons in this manner has been described by 
Mandelbaum’s premise with the anarchical environment of international politics.  Nuclear weapons, he argues, did 
not remove anarchy from the system of nations, but, instead, revolutionized the means of which nations relate to 
each other in the post-Hiroshima/Nagasaki age.  Nuclear weapons act, by making general war too devastating and 
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strategic weapons as a restraining influence, limiting the scope of international conflict during 
the Cold War versus a viewpoint that nuclear weapons de-stabilized the international order and 
increased risk of global war.2  These interpretations all attribute to American nuclear policy a 
single, strategic goal, without regard for the distinctions between tactical and strategic 
applications.3  This study will examine the unique role of tactical weapons in achieving the 
objective of establishing localized and regional military control as part of a defense commitment 
to an ally in order to fulfill a policy goal of containing China. 
Terminology and Definitions 
 
Nuclear weapons exponentially expanded the destructive power of any military force that 
employed them.  This revolution in military ordnance introduced with it a new terminology, 
required to address the inadequacies of the descriptive terms of the old world.  Nuclear fission or 
fission is a subatomic process where atoms are split by the bombardment of neutrons.  The act of 
                                                          
eliminating winners in such a war, as a stabilizing influence.  Since general war would lead to national destruction, 
nations pursued policies designed to avoid major war.  The pursuit of such war-avoidance policies led to a system of 
alliances between the superpowers that came to define the Cold War international order.  Additionally, Mandelbaum 
argues that a critical element of war-avoidance lay in a continuous state of military, retaliatory readiness as a means 
of discouraging aggressive actions, and that the requirement for a continuous state of readiness translated into the 
nuclear arms race. 
2 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
86, 110.  Gaddis supports the theory that nuclear weapons stabilized the Cold War by limiting the scope of conflict.  
He cites the existence of the US and Soviet nuclear stockpiles as restraining each other and preventing escalation of 
the Korean conflict.  Joseph Gerson, Empire and the Bomb: How the US uses Nuclear Weapons to Dominate the 
World (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 4-5.  Gerson argues that the United States utilized the destabilizing influence of 
nuclear weapons to promote an aggressive expansion of American influence on the international stage.  By 
enforcing this policy, Gerson states the US was able to expand its global influence through the use of nuclear 
blackmail. 
3 Stephen Younger, The Bomb: A New History. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 50.  The author best 
explains that the distinction is not recognized is derived from the belief that using tactical nuclear weapons within 
the framework of limited military action would escalate to general war with strategic nuclear weapons. 
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splitting or fissioning atoms releases great amounts of energy.  Fusion, on the other hand, 
involves the combining of two hydrogen atoms to form a helium atom.  The energy released in a 
fusion reaction is often considerably greater than that released in a fission reaction.  Atomic 
weapons, or Atomic Bombs, are weapons that use nuclear fission to derive their explosive power.  
A Hydrogen Bomb is an exclusive term for a gravity-delivered weapon that utilizes fusion to 
create its destructive effects.  Nuclear Weapons encompass both fission and fusion weapons of 
all types, and includes bombs, warheads found in missiles, naval ordinance and artillery shells.  
The pentomic military is a term used for the restructuring of the US military at the divisional 
level which incorporated nuclear weapons into battlefield operations.  Tactical nuclear weapons 
refer to nuclear weapons employed directly on the battlefield with the intent of deciding a 
localized military engagement.  Strategic nuclear weapons refer to nuclear weapons used against 
non-battlefield targets such as industrial centers, large population centers or other national 
infrastructure targets.  In the realm of nuclear weapons policy Counterforce refers to enemy 
combatant forces while Countervalue refers to enemy population centers.4  Deterrence or 
Deterrence Force is the concept of using the threat of force to deter an opposing state or nation 
from conducting an action.5  Second Strike Force Capability is the capability of a nation’s 
nuclear forces to survive an enemy first strike in order to conduct retaliatory action.6  It should be 
                                                          
4 “Counterforce and Countervalue,” Nuclearfiles.org, accessed April 18, 2016, http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-countervalue-force.htm . 
5 “Deterrence,” Nuclearfiles.org, accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-
weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-deterrence.htm . 
6 “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase II – Review of the 





noted that a tactical weapon may be used strategically, and a visa-versa.  The defining element 
for a nuclear weapon, therefore, is the role for which the weapon is used.7  Limited War is a 
conflict involving a portion of a nation’s military and industrial assets, while General War 
involves a considerable portion, sometimes the entire portion, of a nation’s military and 
industrial capability aimed at warfighting. 
 
Methodology and Chapter Outline 
 
 To obtain a clear picture of the role tactical nuclear weapons played in American China 
policy, eight crises, events and contingency plans were examined.  These range from the Korean 
War (1950-1953), the first major crisis between the United States and China, through 1963 with 
the end of the Kennedy Administration and the realization that a nuclear-armed China was an 
inevitability.  The following questions were applied to each event, crisis and contingency in this 
study.  Why did US presidents consider military action against China.  Did the presidential 
administrations of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy truly recognize a distinction between 
tactical nuclear weapons and their strategic counterparts.  What was the degree of importance 
afforded to tactical nuclear weapons by each president?  What factors, both political and military, 
influenced the considerations for tactical weapon utilization?  What specific aspects of China 
policy led US presidents to resort to view tactical nuclear weapons as an essential component in 
                                                          
7 John T Cappello and Gwendolyn M. Hall, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology,” INSS 
Occasional Paper 46, (August, 2002), USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado. 
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military planning?  Why and how did US presidents become dependent on tactical nuclear 
weapons when considering military options against China?  How then, did each president 
employ tactical nuclear weapons in policy against China, and how close did these considerations 
come to actual implementation? 
 Chapter One examines the Truman Administration’s attempts to find a role for nuclear 
weapons during the Korean War and ultimately deciding not to use those weapons.  Historians 
such as John Lewis Gaddis and Appu Soman attribute fear of Soviet involvement for explaining 
why the United States did not use nuclear weapons in Korea.8  This chapter will, instead, show 
that a lack of tactical nuclear capability played a much more important role than fear of Soviet 
retaliation.  The inability to use nuclear weapons effectively on the Korean battlefield wielded 
much more influence with the United States’ military decision against using them than concerns 
that the Soviets would interfere.  The inability to effectively use tactical weapons also explains 
how prestige and the perception of American military strength became a driving factor in 
confronting China.  Additionally, this study will reinforce the historiographical belief espoused 
by Nina Tannnenwald that international pressures, in the form of maintaining the alliance, also 
played a critical role in why nuclear weapons were not used during the Korean War.9 
                                                          
8 Appu K. Soman, Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 
1950-1958, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 217-218.  Soman subscribes to the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons, 
but also addresses a destabilizing influence in that the American nuclear stockpile encouraged Truman (and 
subsequent presidents) toward confrontation because nuclear weapons could be used to extract US military forces 
from untenable military situations. 
9 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Tannenwald presents a new interpretation that challenges the 
stabilization theory for nuclear weapons.  The author argues that an international taboo rather than war avoidance 
policies, were the reason nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War.  This taboo, directed against all 
nuclear weapons was created by a loose, unorganized conglomeration of anti-nuclear political movements both in 
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 Chapter Two explores Eisenhower’s introduction of the New Look military and his 
military solutions for ending the Korean War and contingency planning to defend South Korea in 
the event of a renewed Korean War.  Historians such as Rosemary Foote often focus their 
attention on the extensive diplomatic efforts to end the war and identifying the primary reasons 
for that end.10  This chapter will focus on the role of the administration’s considerations to use 
nuclear weapons to end the Korean War, had diplomatic efforts failed.  This examination will 
illustrate how nuclear weapons had moved to a central position in military planning against 
China.  Furthermore, it will be seen that the role of tactical nuclear doctrine had advanced in 
importance from the Truman Administration, but not quite to the point of becoming a separate 
option in military policy. 
 Chapter Three addresses Eisenhower’s China policy and the expanded role tactical 
nuclear weapons would play in the two Taiwan Straits crises.  A majority of historians tend to 
focus attention on Eisenhower’s modernization of the US military, called the New Look policy, 
and the creation of the pentomic military as a strategic response to the Soviet Union by using the 
nuclear arms race to formulate a war avoidance policy based upon the concept of massive 
retaliation and mutually assured destruction for any two nuclear-armed powers.11  This chapter 
                                                          
the US and abroad.  This taboo manifested itself in the form of domestic and international pressures to influence the 
decisions to refrain from using nuclear weapons. 
10 Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13, no. 3 
(Winter, 1988-1989):108-109. 
11 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), xii. Craig builds on the stabilizing theory by explaining Eisenhower’s integration of nuclear weapons 
into the military was a deliberate effort to restrict United States options in any given crisis in order to avoid general 
war.  Craig argues that Eisenhower’s nuclear policy consisted of an “all or nothing” tactic, where any consideration 
of military options carried with it a high risk of nuclear war, thereby forcing the president to choose a diplomatic 
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will show that Eisenhower’s continuance of Truman’s China policy, which continued to be 
influenced by the role of prestige, and the incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into military 
policy via the pentomic military created an environment that drove the United States to threaten 
China with nuclear attack.  Tactical weapons played a crucial role by allowing the United States 
to commit itself to defending the Republic of China and its surrounding territories.  Over the 
course of the administration, tactical nuclear weapons assumed a singular and distinct role in 
military policy.  Though Eisenhower believed in the military utility and supremacy of tactical 
nuclear weapons, he recognized the political limitations of nuclear weapons, particularly in light 
of public and international pressures against them. 
 Chapter Four examines the Kennedy Administration’s continued reliance on tactical 
nuclear weapons in military planning against China.  The Kennedy Administration is most often 
defined historically by its relationship with the Soviet Union, yet twice during his administration, 
the president planned to attack China with tactical nuclear weapons.  This chapter explains how 
Kennedy recognized the detrimental effects for the United States within the international 
community for defending Taiwan but still allowed domestic factors to steer policy towards 
confrontation.  Once again, tactical nuclear weapons continued to play an essential role in 
American planning and considerations as the United States coped with the imminent rise of 
China as a nuclear-armed, international power, as well as the possibility of Chinese attacks on 
not just Taiwan or the offshores islands, but also India.  Under the Kennedy Administration, 
                                                          
option, since there was no nonnuclear military option available.  This policy, according to the author, is the primary 
reason why the United States did not enter into war with the Soviet Union during the 1950s. 
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however, tactical nuclear weapons policy went a step further than previous administrations when 





CHAPTER ONE: TRUMAN, THE KOREAN WAR AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 
 
 Truman’s nuclear policy during the Korean War is often placed in the context of strategic 
policy, deterrence and domestic politics.  Historian Roger Dingman, for example, makes a case 
that Truman’s actions were designed as much to prove to Republicans that he was tough on 
Communism as it was to warn the Soviet Union not to interfere in Korea.12  John Lewis Gaddis 
argues that Truman used nuclear weapons and the Korean War to justify the massive rearmament 
of the United States military, as outlined in NSC-68.13  This chapter will prove that Truman and 
his advisors sought out various methods in which nuclear weapons could be used during critical 
moments of the Korean War.  It will be seen that even though the Truman Administration 
explored several methods of nuclear policy, it struggled against technical and political obstacles 
that blocked efforts to use nuclear weapons.  The technology of tactical nuclear weapons had not 
matured to the point of providing workable systems that could be used against enemy ground 
forces.  This lack of maturity in tactical nuclear weapons threatened the credibility of the United 
States military while surprisingly strong resistance from United States allies over nuclear 
weapons, both factored heavily in the decision to refrain from using nuclear weapons in Korea. 
 
  
                                                          
12 Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security 13, no 3 (Winter, 1988-
1989): 63-65. 




Setting the Stage: Truman and China 
 
In late 1949, communist Chinese forces, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, defeated 
the last of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the Asian mainland, thereby ending a three-year civil 
war on continental Asia.  The Nationalist leader and American ally, Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the 
island of Taiwan and re-established the Republic of China there.  The flight of Chiang and the 
rise of Mao as a world leader capped a series of events that challenged American policymakers 
attempting to cope with the new, post-World War Two international order.  The aftermath of 
World War Two erased decades of European dominance over the international order and 
supplanted it with a new international order that introduced a new set of dominant players and 
military concepts.  The United States, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China 
would emerge as the leading economic and military world powers.  In the year prior to the fall of 
the Chinese Nationalists, the Soviet Union had blockaded Berlin and conducted its first nuclear 
weapons test.  The events in China, Europe and the Soviet Union combined to impress upon US 
policymakers, and the American public, that the post-war international order was divided 
between two diametrically opposed systems, the Soviet Union and China, combined as 
monolithic communist entities, versus the United States and its allies. 
The US president at the end of World War Two, Harry Truman, faced a world devastated 
by over a decade of worldwide military conflict.  The US emerged as the most powerful nation 
on earth, its military and technical prowess emphasized by the use of two nuclear weapons 
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against Japan in the waning days of the war.  The next most powerful nation, the Soviet Union, 
occupied much of eastern Europe, and possessed the largest army in the world. 
US State Department advisors portrayed the Soviets as a paranoid version of Imperial 
Russia and called for the use of patience, resolve and material strength to change Soviet 
policies.14  China, on the other hand, posed no current military or economic threat to the United 
States.  The immediate attention of the Truman Administration focused on the Soviet Union and 
Europe.15 
President Truman also faced domestic pressures from Congress and the American public.  
Both wanted a rapid demobilization of US military forces from Europe.  European leaders 
resisted de-mobilization, fearing encroachment by the Soviet Union in absence of the US 
military.  Initial post-war plans relied on a US-backed England to control the Soviets in Europe.  
The collapse of the English economy in 1947, however, rendered that plan untenable.16  A 
second plan was then devised, which called for a strong military, including a nuclear deterrent 
force, the rebuilding the European economy and the creation of mutual defense treaties and 
military aid packages to US allies.17 
Enacting this strategy met resistance from the American public, which did not favor 
losing tax cuts and facing increased taxes and inflation to pay for the plan.  To mobilize both 
Congress and the American public behind this policy, Truman addressed the country on March 
                                                          
14 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 32-33. 
15 June Grasso, Truman’s Two-China Policy, 1948-1950, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), 4. 
16 Christensen, 35. 
17 Ibid. 38-39. 
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12, 1947, with his Truman Doctrine speech.  This speech, designed to gain support for giving aid 
specifically to Turkey and Greece, described the international order as a conflict between 
communism and democracy.  To protect democracy, Truman pledged that the United States 
would fight international communism at any location in the world.18 
Truman’s speech succeeded in bringing approval for aid to Greece and Turkey, but 
generated unforeseen results regarding China.  From the point of view of Congress, the situation 
in China fit neatly into the president’s new doctrine.  While Truman would rather have 
selectively enforced the doctrine, Congress viewed the doctrine as a globally inclusive policy.  
As a result, the powerful conglomerate of political and public forces, called the “China Lobby,”19 
held the president’s European policy hostage, agreeing to pass the necessary legislation to aid 
Greece and Turkey only if similar aid reached the Republic of China.  The China Aid Bill, 
passed in 1948, became part of a compromise deal to ensure passage of European aid 
legislation.20 
 With the collapse of the Nationalists on mainland Asia in 1949, the United States faced a 
dilemma over how to treat its defeated ally.  The Nationalists were expected to survive for no 
more than three years.21  American diplomat George Kennan proposed using the US military to 
                                                          
18 Christensen, 50-52. 
19 Earnest R. May, “When Marshall Kept the U.S. Out of War in China,” The Journal of Military History 66 no. 4 
(Oct., 2002): 1005-1006. The author provides the best and most concise description of the conglomeration of 
American elements that vocally called for continued support of the Nationalists in China.  This lobby comprised of 
national press outlets sympathetic to the Nationalist cause, a Republican majority in Congress which viewed the 
president as soft on communism, and members of the military, particularly the Navy. 
20 Ibid., 61-62. 
21 ORE 76-49 Survival Potential of Noncommunist Regimes in China, Oct 19, 1949, CIA website, accessed April 
18, 2016, http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0001098226 . 
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overthrow Chiang and establish Taiwan as a United States protectorate.  Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had preferred to abandon Chiang Kai-Shek, and he persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) to accept the same point of view.  The Nationalist Chinese, however, still retained support 
from elements in the United States.  Republicans in Congress and the Senate, as well as popular 
World War Two General Douglas MacArthur argued publicly for the need to deny Taiwan to the 
Chinese Communists.22 
 In the face of domestic pressure, Truman chose to keep US participation with Taiwan to a 
minimum.  On January 5, 1950, the president went on record to state that the United States 
would not become involved in the Chinese civil war and that the United States would not have 
bases in Taiwan or provide military advice to Nationalist forces.23  A week later, Acheson further 
clarified the administration’s position, stating that the United States considered Taiwan to be 
                                                          
22 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), 165-167. 
23 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 291-292; Christiansen, 194; Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: 
A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 165-167; Jian Chen, China’s 
Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 213-216: Andrew J. Nathan, and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for 
Security, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1997), 56-59; Gaddis, 62-63.  The historiography of 
American China policy can be divided into three interpretations, American responsibility for the confrontation, 
Chinese responsibility, and a shared responsibility.  Adherents blaming the US include Gordon Chang, who cites an 
American policy geared toward splitting the Sino-Soviet alliance, and Thomas Christensen who identifies Truman’s 
inclusion of Taiwan into the American sphere of influence as part of an anti-Communism policy as fueling the 
confrontation with China.  Historians who blame China include Warren Cohen, who blames Chiang Kai-Shek for 
refusing to cooperate in a coalition government with the Chinese Communist Party, leading to the resumption of the 
Chinese Civil War.  Chen Jian also argues that China bears the responsibility for confrontation with the US, citing 
Chinese revolutionary nationalism, the Chinese perception that they held an obligation of loyalty to international 
communism, and a Chinese political goal of maintaining the dynamics of the domestic communist revolution in 
China.  Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross argue that Mao Zedong always intended to align with the Soviet Union and 
were obligated to confront the US as part of the Sino-Soviet alliance.  Finally, John Lewis Gaddis adopts a middle 
ground approach, citing US domestic pressures and Truman’s lack of clear policy objectives combined with China’s 
self-imposed domestic conditions as leading to a state of confrontation between the two nations. 
14 
 
Chinese territory.24  Six months later, the outbreak of the Korean War, brought Taiwan back into 
the sphere of American interest and led to a series of confrontations with China.25  Through these 
confrontations, tactical nuclear weapons would become the central instrument of military policy 
used to contain China. 
 
The Korean War Begins 
 
 On June 25, 1950, forces of the North Korean military attacked South Korea and made 
considerable advances down the peninsula, driving before them South Korean forces and a small 
contingent of American advisors.  Prior to the outbreak of war, Korea did not possess a 
significant place in American defense policy.  The small, peninsular nation that divides the 
Yellow Sea from the Sea of Japan, shared borders with China and the Soviet Union, and lay less 
than 100 miles from Japan, was divided into north and south halves in August, 1948, at the 38th 
parallel.  The northern half of Korea was ruled by a communist government under the leadership 
of Kim il Sung.  The southern half of Korea was led by President Syngman Rhee, placed in 
power primarily through the efforts of the United States.26 
 That North Korea might attack South Korea in an attempt to reunite Korea did not escape 
the attention of the Truman Administration.  Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that should 
                                                          
24 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York, W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc. 1969), 351. 
 
26 Bruce Cummings, The Korean War: A History, (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 109-112. 
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war break out on the Korean peninsula, the US should use the United Nations to deal with the 
situation, and not the US military.27  The United States perceived Communist North Korea as a 
satellite of the Soviet Union.  This impression led to the belief that North Korea could not 
conduct long term military operations against South Korea without substantial Soviet support.  
Nor did the administration believe China would involve itself in Korea, believing that fear of 
general war over Korea would drive the Soviets to restrain China from interfering on the Korean 
peninsula.28  Even if North Korea attacked, the administration placed its faith in the South 
Korean military to defend itself.29  As a result, the administration publicly stated, through 
Acheson and MacArthur, that Korea was not considered part of the American Pacific defense 
perimeter.30 
The June 25 attack itself did not surprise the Truman Administration, but North Korea’s 
remarkable gains against the South Koreans did.  The success of this attack, believed only 
possible with Soviet aid, cemented in the minds of Truman and his advisors that international 
communism posed a significant threat to American national security.31  Policymakers in the 
Truman Administration felt that the attack in Korea presented an opportunity to curtail Soviet 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 72. 
28 Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, June 19, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(hereafter referenced as FRUS), 1950, Korea, Volume VII, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1950), 109. 
29 Cummings, 72. 
30 Acheson, 357.  Acheson stated that the United States Pacific defense perimeter consisted of the Philippines, 
Okinawa, the Ryukyu archipelago, Japan, the Aleutians and Alaska.  Excluded were both Korea and Taiwan.  
MacArthur publicly identified the same perimeter March 1, 1949. 
31 Wilson D. Miscamble, “The Foreign Policy of the Truman Administration: A Post-Cold War Appraisal,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 24, no 3 Conduct of Foreign Policy (Summer, 1994): 488-489; Robert Griffith, 
“Truman and the Historians: The Reconstruction of Postwar American History,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History 
59 no 1 (Autumn, 1975): 31; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 291-292; Gaddis, 75-84. 
16 
 
expansion and influence.  While it was hoped that the North Koreans could be stopped quickly, 
and by the South Koreans, there remained considerable concern over the reaction of the Soviet 
Union to any American, or United Nations, actions in Korea.  The cautious, prevailing opinion in 
the administration, especially amongst the military, was that the Soviet Union was not ready for 
war.32 
Nevertheless, as part of a contingency option, the use of nuclear weapons was discussed 
as a means of eliminating Soviet fighters based in Shanghai.  On the evening of June 25, Truman 
ordered the USAF to make preparations for destroying all Soviet airfields in the Far East region, 
but not to take action.  Army General Douglas MacArthur was to send a survey group to Korea, 
and the State Department was instructed to determine where the Soviets might act next.33  Over 
the next week, while South Korean forces retreated, the United Nations formed a unified 
command under the leadership of MacArthur. 
MacArthur thought the situation in Korea provided a unique opportunity to use nuclear 
weapons, and requested that the JCS grant him atomic bombs.34  The JCS already had a 
contingency to move nuclear weapons to Guam in the event of an Asian crisis, thus the JCS 
approved MacArthur’s request and dispatched ten nuclear weapons from the stockpile to the 
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Pacific base.  These weapons, however, remained outside of MacArthur’s command and required 
72 hours to assemble and a presidential order before they could be used.35 
Even as the United States Air Force (USAF) shuttled nuclear weapons across the Pacific, 
the higher levels of the military and the administration had developed concerns over their use.  
Specialists in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs argued that there were few viable targets in 
Korea and that world opinion would be overwhelmingly negative.36  A JCS study substantiated 
the opinions of the Far Eastern bureau, finding that the situation in Korea did not provide a 
favorable environment for the employment of nuclear weapons.  The JCS worried that 
ineffective use of nuclear weapons would harm the strategic deterrent value of the nuclear 
stockpile.37  At Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Curtiss LeMay argued that any nuclear 
bombardment of Korea should be conducted as part of a larger strategic nuclear bombardment of 
China.38  Even those in the administration who advocated the use of nuclear weapons conceded 
that such employment could have considerable consequences, including escalation into general 
war with the Soviet Union and alienating US allies.39 
At this point in the conflict, the American nuclear arsenal remained relatively small, with 
approximately 300 Mark 4 atomic bombs in the entire stockpile, all of them strategic in nature 
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and reserved for use against the Soviet Union.40  Early in the Korean War, the administration 
faced a number of challenges in defining a role for nuclear weapons.  Though the United States 
had no nuclear weapons dedicated to the tactical mission, Truman still tried to find some use for 
nuclear weapons in the Korean conflict.  Elements of the administration could not form a 
consensus over what role nuclear weapons would play.  Truman and the JCS quickly made 
nuclear weapons the central component in countering Soviet Air Force involvement.  MacArthur 
wanted to use them against ground forces, even though the military’s own findings found the 
Mark 4 atomic bomb was not suitable for ground combat.41 
Publicly, the president dismissed the use of nuclear weapons, stating during a July 27 
press conference that he was not considering using atomic weapons.42  The administration, 
however, continued to quietly explore those situations where nuclear weapons could be 
employed.  The two most likely scenarios involved using nuclear weapons to cover the 
evacuation of United Nations forces in the event of retreat, and, to counter the intervention by 
Chinese forces.43  A review of options by the Office of Chinese Affairs also determined that if 
significant reinforcements could not be obtained to counter Chinese intervention, then strategic 
bombing of China, including the use of nuclear weapons would be necessary.  The office further 
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concluded that chemical weapons should be used tactically against Chinese troops.  The use of 
nuclear weapons, however, was not believed to be a deterrent to Soviet intervention.44 
The administration’s belief that China would be restrained by the Soviets from 
intervening had clearly reversed by November, and concerns were increasing that China, and 
even the Soviet Union, might intercede.  A successful offensive into North Korea by United 
Nations forces could trigger a reaction from China or the Soviet Union.45  To offset Chinese 
intervention, Paul Nitze, the Director of Policy Planning, raised the prospect that nuclear 
weapons could be used tactically against strictly military targets.  The director felt that nuclear 
weapons used in this manner would avoid large scale civilian casualties.  Strategic attacks, he 
argued, contained the risk of high civilian casualties, and would assuredly bring about Soviet 
intervention.46 
In spite of the risk of provoking Chinese intervention, the war was prosecuted under a 
United Nations resolution to unify Korea.  Landings at Inchon, North Korea, on September 15, 
took the North Koreans by surprise.  With a large enemy presence in their rear, the North 
Koreans retreated.  By mid-October, United Nations forces had not only retaken South Korea, 
but occupied a majority of North Korea.47  As United Nations forces drove north and approached 
the border between China and North Korea, they encountered increasing signs that the Chinese 
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military had a significant presence in the area.  MacArthur chose to dismiss concerns from both 
his subordinate officers and the White House warning of the threat of Chinese intervention.48 
The administration’s understanding by November was that nuclear weapons should only 
be used in militarily desperate situations, and even in such situations, there were few suitable 
targets for either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons in China.  This understanding also 
included recognition that the international community looked upon nuclear weapons as 
“America’s monster,” and that using nuclear weapons in Korea would cost the US its moral 
position, grant the Soviets a propaganda victory and destroy United Nations unity in Korea.  Any 
use of nuclear weapons, therefore, would have to include the approval of the United Nations, as 
well as the strength of will to endure the political consequences.49 
 
The Korean War: Chinese Intervention 
 
On November 25, 1950, over 300,000 Communist Chinese troops conducted an offensive 
along the entire width of the Korean peninsula, achieving near total surprise against United 
Nations forces in Korea.  Four days later, UN forces were ordered to fall back in full retreat.50  
The military situation was very grave.  General Omar Bradley felt that UN forces would suffer a 
complete collapse by December 5, while Secretary of Defense General George Marshall 
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discussed the possibility of a Dunkirk-style evacuation of all forces.51  Truman now faced the 
very situation for which it was determined nuclear weapons were necessary for resolution.  Army 
Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, dispatched to Korea to assess the situation with 
MacArthur, reported MacArthur’s opinion that to save the United Nations in Korea, the US 
policy prohibiting attacks on China would have to change, and the utilization of nuclear weapons 
was a distinct possibility.52 
It was in the midst of the growing crisis that Truman himself unwittingly unleashed a 
flurry of negative publicity over nuclear weapons.  During a November 30 press conference 
addressing the crisis in Korea, a reporter asked Truman if atomic bombs would be used.  His 
vague responses led to a series of questions about nuclear weapons, ending with Truman stating 
that nuclear weapons had always been a consideration.53  Realizing the potential reaction to his 
statement, Truman’s staff attempted to clarify that consideration did not mean utilization.  It was 
too late, though, as there was an immediate outcry from both the American public and the 
international community.54  England and the European nations led a vocal protest in the United 
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Nations, while most Asian and African nations followed suit.  All argued that nuclear weapons in 
Korea had little military value and risked escalation with the Soviet Union.55 
As a direct result of the president’s statements, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
with the full support of the British government, cabled Washington to request an immediate 
meeting over the situation, in which Truman agreed.  Over the course of the December meeting, 
Attlee requested that the United States end its conflict with China and for Great Britain to have a 
participatory role in future considerations to use nuclear weapons.  Truman was adamant that he 
would not commit the United States to any agreement limiting his authority to use nuclear 
weapons.  The two leaders agreed to issue a communique stressing that they hoped nuclear 
weapons would not be needed, and that Truman would inform Attlee of American intentions.56 
As the situation unfolded on the Korean peninsula, MacArthur desperately called for 
expanding military operations to include the Chinese mainland.  Among his requests were for air 
attacks on the Chinese mainland, a naval blockade of China, more reinforcements, and nuclear 
strikes in North Korea.  Upon hearing of Truman’s remarks at the November press briefing, 
MacArthur quickly notified the Air Force Far East Commander, General George Stratemeyer, 
and presented a list of twenty-six desired targets for nuclear strikes within both China and the 
Soviet Union.57  LeMay, though he believed the administration would not use nuclear weapons, 
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ordered special radar units shipped to Korea to establish radar coverage of probable targets for 
atomic bombing.58 
The JCS, however, had become concerned with what it thought was an increased chance 
of general war.  The small size of the nuclear stockpile became a restricting factor on American 
military actions.  Nuclear weapons were not to be used in Korea when they might be needed later 
should the conflict escalate.  MacArthur received orders to conduct a fighting retreat on the 
Korean peninsula, with the goal of grinding down the Chinese offensive.  The JCS felt they 
could stop the offensive and remain in Korea, but, should the military situation become dire, 
United Nations forces would be evacuated from the peninsula rather than engage in further 
escalation.59 
The lack of tactical capability, the small size of the stockpile and the negative reactions 
from American allies forced the administration to conclude that nuclear weapons had no useful 
purpose in the Korean theater.  As a result, United Nations forces had to rely on conventional 
military strength to stop the Chinese advance.  It took nearly two months for Allied forces to 
stabilize the military situation.  By the end of January, 1951, the Chinese advance had been 
halted, but not before China had retaken all of North Korea and the northernmost fifty miles of 
South Korea.60 
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The Korean War: Final Nuclear Considerations 
 
Two months later, the Truman Administration, for the last time, gave serious 
consideration to the use of nuclear weapons in Korea.  By early April 1951, United Nations 
forces had recaptured South Korea and pushed the Chinese back to the 38th parallel.61  The JCS 
was alarmed, however, by an apparent troop buildup in China, just north of the Chinese-North 
Korean border on the Yalu River.  A request to transfer custody of nuclear weapons from the 
civilian Atomic Energy Commission to the military was forwarded to the president.  Truman 
approved the transfer, but why he agreed to do so are not entirely clear, and some historians have 
proposed that the transfer was granted to solve a problem Truman had with MacArthur. 
MacArthur had made controversial statements regarding Korea for several months, but 
during March of 1951, he had made several public comments disparaging of the American 
military leadership.  According to Truman and Dean Acheson, this is the reason why he was 
removed from his command by Truman and the JCS on April 11.62  Some historians, however, 
have identified the role the transfer of nuclear weapons played in securing MacArthur’s 
dismissal.  By giving the military custody of a few atomic bombs, Truman purchased 
cooperation from the JCS in relieving MacArthur of his command.63 
The weapons that had been transported to Guam in July 1950 were transferred to military 
control on April 24.  The understanding between field commanders in Korea and SAC was that 
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the weapons could not be used without a direct order from the JCS.  By November, LeMay 
requested that the nine nuclear weapons be returned to the United States.  Truman may have 
been willing to grant the military those weapons because he had already concluded, as he told 
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Gordon Dean, that he would not use nuclear weapons in 
North Korea.64  In the end, the only benefit Truman gained from nuclear weapons was the 
removal of the recalcitrant MacArthur. 
For the rest of his term, Truman did not actively consider the use of nuclear weapons 
against the Chinese or North Koreans.  The administration did, however, continue to seek new 
methods of using nuclear weapons through threats, if not actual utilization.  Twice, once during 
1951 and once during 1952, the administration considered or acted on threatening to use nuclear 
weapons against the Chinese and North Koreans in an effort to force those two nations to 
concede the war.  In late 1951, the air force conducted Operation Hudson Harbor, using solitary 
B-29 bombers to conduct simulated nuclear attacks on North Korean cities.  In addition to the 
intimidation value of such attacks, Operation Hudson Harbor was part of the JCS study of 
tactical nuclear weapons and determined there was a higher level of difficulty in using tactical 
nuclear weapons in Korea, concluding that such weapons would, most likely, have little military 
effect.65  The second attempt at threatening nuclear attack was the product of the State 
Department.  In 1952, the department proposed spreading rumors that the president was under 
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tremendous domestic pressure to end the war and that nuclear weapons were his only option.66  
Unlike Operation Hudson Harbor, the State Department plan was never implemented. 
Historians seldom look at Truman’s Korean War nuclear policy in the light of tactical 
nuclear doctrine.  It could be reasoned that this is so because viable tactical weapons did not exist 
during the Truman Administration.  A lack of hardware or doctrine, however, does not mean 
there was a lack of influence.  What this chapter demonstrates is that the absence of tactical 
capability factored considerably into the Truman Administration’s decision not to use nuclear 
weapons in the Korean theater of operations. 
 The evidence is clear that Truman and his advisors sought different ways in which they 
could employ nuclear weapons in Korea, including tactical applications.  Deterrence, strategic 
applications against the Soviets and the Chinese, and tactical applications against the Chinese 
and North Koreans, were all considered within the first ten months of the war.  Yet, by April 
1952, the administration had eliminated actual use of nuclear weapons as an option and relegated 
nuclear policy in Korea to bluffing its way through empty threats via Operation Hudson Harbor. 
The inability of the US military to effectively use tactical nuclear weapons impacted 
American policy in three distinct ways.  First is the practical reason that the United States only 
had one model of nuclear weapon in its inventory through April, 1951.  The Mark 4 atomic 
bomb was a purely strategic weapon which the JCS and the USAF had determined would fail if 
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applied to direct battlefield use.  The inventory did expand and grow more diverse as the war 
progressed, with the Mark 6 weapons entering into service by July, 1951, and the B5 bomb 
beginning production in May 1952.67  By then, however, the Truman Administration had ruled 
out nuclear weapons use in Korea in order to preserve the international alliance. 
Second, from the political and strategic viewpoints, using a weapons system that would 
fail to achieve its primary objectives would damage the reputation and credibility of that system, 
in this case nuclear weapons.  The administration feared that failure of strategic nuclear weapons 
employed in the tactical role would significantly harm the value of these weapons as a strategic 
deterrent.  It was better not to use those weapons and avoid highlighting their shortcomings, than 
to use them to no effect and damage their reputation in the international community as a strategic 
deterrent. 
Third, in 1950 through 1951, the United States nuclear stockpile remained very small 
consisting of only three hundred weapons.  The JCS worried that should Korea escalate into a 
larger conflict they would need all of those weapons for use against the Soviet Union.  Using 
these weapons tactically in Korea, aside from not being effective, would also diminish the United 
States’ ability to conduct nuclear operations against what the JCS perceived to be the more 
threatening enemy, the Soviets. 
The three factors mentioned above, all stemming from the lack of tactical capability, 
provide the military logic for not using nuclear weapons in Korea.  There also existed a strictly 
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political logic that worked against using nuclear weapons.  This logic originated from the 
overwhelming international resistance to nuclear weapons from America’s allies.  This resistance 
was so strong as to lead one ally, Great Britain, to actually seek to control American nuclear 
policy.  While this attempt failed, it illustrated to Truman that nuclear weapons could endanger 
the political cohesion of the allied coalition in Korea.  Keeping the United Nations military 
alliance together surpassed the military necessities on the Korean peninsula as a priority.  
Truman’s decision to abandon Korea, if the UN military could not hold the peninsula, rather than 
use nuclear weapons in an attempt to save the situation, illustrates the high priority he held for 
keeping the alliance together. 
Of the three administrations in this study, the Truman Administration represents a unique 
case in that the influence of tactical nuclear weapons in China policy stems from the non-
existence of those very weapons.  That the US nuclear inventory was exclusively strategic during 
the early days of the Korean War and that such weapons were unsuitable for battlefield use was a 
major factor for why nuclear weapons were not used.  Though considered and explored by the 
Truman Administration, tactical nuclear weapons were ultimately removed from policy 
considerations.  As the war progressed, the need to preserve the cooperation of American allies 
in Korea overtook the military considerations, so, when tactical weapons eventually became 
available toward the end of the Truman Administration, they were no longer an option.  The 
height of reasoning against nuclear weapons occurred during December 1950 and January 1951, 
when the lack of tactical capability overlapped with the resounding and increasing international 
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outcry against nuclear weapons, combined to steer the Truman Administration to remove nuclear 




CHAPTER TWO: EISENHOWER AND THE END OF THE KOREAN 
WAR 
 
 By November 1952, the Korean War had lasted over twenty-nine months.  The early 
optimism exhibited following MacArthur’s surprisingly successful advances in October 1950 
was lost when the Chinese entered the war and drove back United Nations forces.  Since the 
Chinese intervention, the Korean front had changed little from the pre-war boundary between 
North and South Korea.  The end of 1952, however, brought change in American leadership.  
The democrats lost the 1952 presidential election to Dwight Eisenhower, the former Allied 
Commander in Europe during World War Two.  Eisenhower won a clear victory against his 
opponent, Adlai Stevenson, following the 1952 presidential campaign in which both anti-
communism and the Korean War were major issues.68  Eisenhower would oversee a fundamental 
shift in nuclear weapons policy by placing tactical nuclear weapons at the center of any given 
military situation between Communist China and the United States.  The Korean War was the 
first of a series of crises with China during the Eisenhower Administration in which tactical 
nuclear weapons would become essential to policy. 
 Historians often focus their interpretations of Eisenhower policies on the strategic impact 
of nuclear weapons and their role in international policy.  Joseph Gerson, for example, argues 
that the intent of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation policy was to elevate any conflict to a 
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strategic level and use the United States nuclear arsenal as leverage against any potential 
adversary.69  Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair direct their arguments entirely on Eisenhower’s use 
of strategic nuclear weapons, the US relationship with the Soviet Union and the stabilizing 
effects of strategic nuclear weapons.70  The research in this chapter will illustrate how tactical 
nuclear weapons rose in prominence as a policy tool for use against China, primarily through the 
defense of Korea.  The president sought to use nuclear weapons to end a limited war against 
China, and not for deterrence.  In considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons, Eisenhower 
found himself between American allies, who resisted the use of nuclear weapons, and the 
American military, which wanted to use nuclear weapons in a general war with China. 
Unlike Truman, Eisenhower entered the presidency with a considerable amount of 
knowledge regarding nuclear weapons.  He was first briefed on the atomic bomb in 1945 and its 
pending use against Japan.  At that time, Eisenhower opposed using the weapon on the grounds 
that he believed Japan was already defeated and that such an action would shock the world and 
generate negative reactions aimed against the United States.71  When he learned in 1948 that US 
nuclear readiness was lacking, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Eisenhower ordered 
increased preparedness training as well as streamlining the process of releasing nuclear weapons 
for deployment.  In July 1949, as the Chief of Staff for the Army, Eisenhower was present when 
Truman announced that nuclear arms control would never work, and as a result, the United 
                                                          
69 Gerson, 78 
70 Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blai, eds, Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 13, 48. 
71 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change 1953-1956, (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1963), 312-313. 
32 
 
States would need to maintain an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons.72  Finally, as the 
first commander of NATO, he was briefed by members of Cal-Tech’s Project Vista about the 
possibilities of using tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe.73 
For Eisenhower, tactical nuclear weapons represented an element of what he called the 
economics of national security.74  A nuclear armed military unit could project considerably more 
power and capability than an equivalent unit armed only with conventional weapons.  This 
aspect made nuclear weapons militarily and economically superior to conventional weapons.75  
Eisenhower also recognized that the method of warfighting had changed, and he felt the methods 
used successfully during World War Two were no longer adequate in the post-war era.  Allowing 
the enemy to overrun territory that could be liberated later was no longer an acceptable form of 
defense policy.  In the event of war, all of a nation’s combat assets would be committed, 
including atomic weapons.76  Eisenhower would enter his presidency with a clear and distinct 
belief that nuclear weapons, particularly tactical weapons, represented a core element of the post-
World War Two military. 
 Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested that the key to ending the 
war lay in dealing directly with the Soviet Union.  Dulles did not think of China as just another 
                                                          
72 Rhodes, Dark Sun, 320, 363. 
73 Kenneth Jerold Comfort, National Security Policy and the Development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 1948-
1958, (Cohoes, NY: The Public Administration Institute of New York State, 2005), 61-62: Ryan, 150. 
74Eisenhower Archives, speeches collection, CPX Conference, April 11, 1952, Paris, France, accessed April 18, 
2016, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/pre_presidential_speeches.pdf  . 
75 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race, (New York: Random House, 2007), 
75. 




satellite of the Soviet Union.  “The Soviet Union cannot impose its will on Communist China in 
the same arbitrary way that it imposes its will on Poland or Rumania, etc,” Dulles wrote the 
president in late 1952.  The secretary recognized that China relented to the Soviet Union by 
choice and felt that ending the conflict would rely not on addressing the local situation in Korea 
but on the overall situation in Southeast Asia.  From Dulles’ perspective, the Korean War 
represented an opportunity for the Soviets to bog down American efforts and resources 
regionally, and even globally.  Dulles also believed that re-unification of Korea under Rhee 
would not be practicable and that the post-war situation should revert back to the original 
boundaries of a divided Korea.  Dulles advised Eisenhower to tell Rhee that re-unification of 
Korea was important to US interests, but that the US would never risk a third world war to 
achieve it.77 
 Further advice came from the former commander of United Nations forces in Korea, 
General Douglas MacArthur.  He too argued that the US deal exclusively with the Soviets and 
negotiate to reunify not just Korea, but Germany under a popularly elected government, and to 
remove all foreign troops from Korea, Germany, Japan, and Austria.  If these terms were not 
met, then the United States should use nuclear weapons to clear North Korea of North Korean 
and Chinese troops and to use radioactive fallout to render parts of Korea inhabitable.  
Additionally, China itself should be attacked in order to deprive it of its industrial base and 
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supply lines from the Soviets.78  Eisenhower, in his memoirs, cited this letter to illustrate the 
necessity of using nuclear weapons if a major offensive were to be required to break the 
stalemate on the Korean peninsula.79  At the end of 1952, however, the United States possessed a 
limited supply of tactical nuclear weapons, all of which had been deployed to Europe.80  
Furthermore, MacArthur’s proposal of what essentially amounted to establishing a permanent, 
radioactive wasteland in Korea goes far beyond tactical, or even strategic, battlefield necessity.  
Eisenhower only mentioned MacArthur’s suggestion for the use of nuclear weapons, and omitted 
any reference to the use of fallout against the enemy.81 
 Eisenhower announced changes in Korean policy during his State of the Union address 
on February 2, 1953, beginning with the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet, which had been 
stationed between Taiwan and China since Truman ordered it there shortly after the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950.  According to Eisenhower, the presence of the fleet, originally deployed 
to stop a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and a Nationalist attack on China, served to protect China.  
The withdrawal of the fleet put the Chinese on notice that the war would either end or expand 
into China itself.82  In coordination with the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet, the USAF 
conducted one of its largest air raids against North Korea.83 
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The Korean War: Planning for the End 
 
In considering US actions to end the Korean War, Eisenhower quickly raised the prospect 
of using tactical nuclear weapons.  One week after the State of the Union address, the president 
was informed of a troop buildup within the Kaesong sanctuary (established during previous 
armistice negotiations, the sanctuary was an area in which the allies agreed not to attack). 
General Mark Clark believed that this was a prelude to offensive operations by the Chinese.  
Secretary of State Dulles asked if it was time to no longer respect the boundaries of the 
sanctuary, which the president agreed.  The president then elaborated that the military situation 
within the sanctuary provided an ideal situation to use tactical nuclear weapons.  Dulles added 
that there were moral implications and restrictions on using nuclear weapons, explaining that the 
Soviets had successfully cast nuclear weapons as a separate category of weapon from 
conventional weapons and that the United States should try to “break down this false 
distinction.”  The president then stated that if the Allies objected to the use of nuclear weapons, 
then perhaps they could contribute three more divisions to the Korean theater of operations.84  
During this meeting both the president and the secretary of state revealed a key element about 
their beliefs on the role of nuclear weapons in policy.  That belief was that tactical applications 
for nuclear weapons bore no distinction from the tactical use of conventional weapons.  Both 
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men also recognized that the international community did not share this same belief, and that any 
policy decision using nuclear weapons would have to overcome this discrepancy. 
 As new weapon designs became operational and the nuclear stockpile grew, the military 
overcame its earlier concerns under Truman regarding the effectiveness of nuclear weapons and 
thoroughly endorsed the necessity of nuclear weapons for any attempt to expand the war outside 
of Korea.  Two of the three attending generals at the March 27, NSC meeting, advocated for the 
use of nuclear weapons, with USAF General Hoyt Vandenberg stating that they would be most 
effective against Chinese bases in Manchuria.  Only Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton 
Collins dissented, questioning the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in Korea and pointing out 
that United States forces were vulnerable to nuclear attack both at Pusan and in Japan.85 
General Collins’ opinion represented a minority within the Eisenhower Administration.  
Even civilian advisors endorsed using nuclear weapons in Korea.  An advisory committee 
created to review American options and explore the economic ramifications of US policy in 
Korea generally favored the use of nuclear weapons to end the Korean War.  Members of the 
committee felt the American public would tolerate the use of nuclear weapons.  Eisenhower was 
well aware that the opinions of American allies did not match those of his administration.  Nor 
did he think that those opinions should be ignored, or that the United States should act 
unilaterally on the issue.  The president felt that American allies had a right to be concerned, 
given that those allies, especially the European nations, thought of themselves as caught between 
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the United States and the Soviet Union.  This attitude prohibited American use of nuclear 
weapons, and without nuclear weapons, the United States military options were severely limited.  
Both Eisenhower and Dulles agreed that the US needed to “make every effort to eliminate this 
attitude.”86 
By May 1953, the administration had narrowed down its military choices for ending the 
Korean War to two options, with each option containing three separate methods of execution.  
The first option called for increased pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans within Korea.  
The second option increased pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans by expanding the war 
outside of the Korean peninsula.  These options did not specifically mention the use of nuclear 
weapons, but an analysis conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence 
Advisory Committee calculated that using nuclear weapons would demonstrate to the Chinese 
and Soviets the Western determination to prosecute the war to a conclusion.  This by itself, the 
CIA felt, would not guarantee concessions from the Chinese.  The intelligence service added that 
communist reaction to nuclear attack would depend on the amount of damage incurred from such 
attacks.87 
 As the NSC continued to address the Korean War, the president re-iterated his belief in 
the necessity of using nuclear weapons and the need to break down resistance to nuclear 
weapons.  In early May, the president stated that he had reached the conclusion that the atomic 
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bomb was simply another weapon in the American arsenal.88  The military felt that operations 
outside Korea would require nuclear weapons, while the JCS stated that in order to be effective, 
the US would have to use several nuclear weapons, and that there were no good strategic targets 
within Korea.  The president disagreed about targets in Korea, stating he was not convinced that 
the weapons would be ineffective.  Discussion then centered on the reactions of American allies, 
with Eisenhower asking what would happen between the US and its Allies.  Secretary Smith 
answered that NATA (North Atlantic Treaty Alliance) would “temporarily go to pieces,” but if 
the situation in Korea could be resolved and general war avoided, those relationships with other 
countries could be rebuilt.  The president responded that the US needed its allies for defense and 
that he did not want these allies to desert the United States.89  This, of course, placed Eisenhower 
in the same predicament as Truman.  The president felt that nuclear weapons were necessary to 
end the war, but, by using nuclear weapons, the United States would lose the cooperation of its 
allies. 
 By the end of May, the JCS concluded if the war could not end through diplomatic 
efforts, then it would have to expand outside Korea.  A key component of this expansion was the 
destruction of the entire Chinese air force.  The president agreed and emphasized the necessity of 
expanding the war and that nuclear weapons were necessary in order to obtain a favorable end to 
the war.  Expanding the war contained risks and Eisenhower worried that escalating the conflict 
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would place Japan in a position vulnerable to Soviet attack, or that general war would break out 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 90  These concerns did not dissuade Eisenhower 
from his belief that nuclear action represented the best plan “if circumstances arose which would 
force the United States to expand the war.”  The president suggested that May 1954 be set as the 
target date for increasing the military pressure on Korea and China.91  But the war ended in July 
1953, and the nuclear offensive was not needed. 
There is a disparity between historians and Eisenhower over what influence nuclear 
weapons held in ending the Korean War.  The president credited what he defined as a series of 
nuclear threats levied against China in the last days of May and the first days of June.  According 
to Eisenhower, these threats were delivered discretely through diplomatic contacts in India; 
threats that Eisenhower claimed in his memoirs reached both the Chinese and Soviets.92  John 
Foster Dulles, also made such an assertion in a 1956 interview with Life magazine, claiming to 
have expressed a nuclear threat to China in May 1953, transmitted by the leader of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru.93 
 Evidence to support these assertions, however, has been lacking, or even refuted.   Nehru, 
for example, denied any role in delivering a message from Dulles to the Chinese.94  A message 
delivered by US ambassador Bohlen to the Soviets regarding the expansion of the war has been 
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seen as too vague to carry a nuclear threat, and is interpreted more as a request of the Soviets to 
pressure China into ending the war.95  Few historians give much credit to the threat of nuclear 
attack as more than a peripheral cause for the end of the Korean War.96 
Instead of Eisenhower’s nuclear threats, most historians cite the death of Stalin in March, 
1953, followed by a change in Soviet policies as holding the most influence over the end of the 
war.97  Other factors include deteriorating North Korean morale and the USAF strategic bombing 
campaign against North Korean cities.98 Historian Rosemary Foot also identifies a perception 
amongst the Chinese leadership that Eisenhower’s election represented a considerable shift in 
American policy toward a more aggressive stance against China.99 
Threats of nuclear attack can come in various forms other than through diplomatic 
channels, and from the Chinese perspective, the United States appeared to be very belligerent 
with non-diplomatic nuclear threats throughout the war.  During the Truman Administration, the 
air force conducted Operation Hudson Harbor, in which single aircraft flew unarmed bombing 
sorties over North Korean cities imitating the flight procedure for nuclear weapon delivery.  
During both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the United States engaged in 
extensive nuclear testing, much of which was both public and heavily involved in tactical 
development.  Even while American policy makers discussed the merits of utilizing tactical 
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nuclear weapons in Korea, the national press made very public associations between the nuclear 
testing program and the potential for use on the Korean peninsula.  The Chinese leadership paid 
close attention to these nuclear testing activities.  Information from American nuclear tests 
alarmed the Chinese in that the rhetoric and publicity regarding the tests seemed to indicate the 
US was moving closer to using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, yet, the very same 
information revealed that certain precautions taken by the Chinese (fortification and troop 
dispersion) would help to protect ground forces from nuclear attack.100 
 The credibility of any nuclear threat hinges on the known ability to carry out such threats.  
US tactical capability remained limited throughout the Korean War.  The much vaunted atomic 
cannon did not conduct its first test until May 25, 1953, and even then, was widely considered to 
be an ineffective weapons system.  Furthermore, the few tactical nuclear bombs available were 
deployed to Europe, and therefore not available for use in Asia.101  The Chinese government also 
felt that the threat of Soviet nuclear retaliation would restrain the United States.102   The factors 
mentioned above helped to diminish the efficacy of nuclear threats from the United States.  
Chinese leadership did not consider an American nuclear attack a likely possibility, but instead 
feared an amphibious assault on mainland China as more probable.103 
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The New Look and Massive Retaliation 
 
During Eisenhower’s first State of the Union address, he unveiled a new military policy 
designed to keep American armed forces modern and capable while still economical.  The 
president reorganized the military’s higher ranks and added the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Director of the Budget and the Director of the United States Information Agency to the National 
Security Council.  Admiral Arthur W. Radford was appointed as the new Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  The focus on policy would build a military that Eisenhower described as 
“adequate” for the defense requirements of the United States, but without “extravagance.”104  
The president saw technology as a means of keeping the US military a formidable force that 
could economically maintain national security and honor its overseas commitments.  The 
Department of Defense would focus on the most modern weaponry in an effort to prevent the US 
military from falling behind in technical prowess.105 
To reduce the extravagance of large, expensive militaries and provide the most efficient 
counterforce possible, nuclear weapons were to be incorporated into US strategy.  Tactical 
nuclear weapons were widely believed to be effective at countering the extremely large armies 
fielded by the Soviet Union and China, thus they would be incorporated into divisional-level 
tactics of the army, a practice called the pentomic military.  The prevailing thought behind 
tactical battlefield warfare dictated that ground armies would deploy smaller, mobile, nuclear-
armed units.  By relying on tactical nuclear weapons, the army’s personnel requirements could 
                                                          
104 Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 450-452. 
105 Ibid., 132. 
43 
 
be significantly reduced, in theory.106 Since aerial delivery of nuclear weapons was the dominant 
means of deployment, the USAF was given modest increases in both money and personnel.107  
Because of the pentomic military, much of the budget cuts were directed at the army, which lost 
nearly a third of its funding in 1953, as well as reduction in personnel.108 
Often associated with Eisenhower’s military reform is the strategic doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation.  The term originates from a speech by Secretary Dulles when he stated that the 
United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons, at its discretion, for “massive retaliatory 
power” to counter Communist aggression throughout the world.  Since that moment, historians 
have often tied the doctrine of Massive Retaliation with the military modernization policy of the 
New Look, stating that both were part of a strategic policy of deterrence aimed at the Soviet 
Union.109  More recently, historians such as Campbell Craig have evolved an interpretation that 
Massive Retaliation was a policy of war avoidance that attached the risk of general war to any 
limited war scenario, the greatest effect being that the United States military was denied the 
ability to fight in small war situations.110  This is the exact opposite of what some earlier 
historians such as Gerson argue, that by linking general war to limited war, the opponents of the 
United States would be “nuclear-blackmailed” into conceding the issue.111 
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These interpretations are built on the assumption that all nuclear weapons are the same, 
and that there is no distinction within the role or missions of strategic or tactical nuclear 
weapons.  As seen in this chapter and the next, President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles 
clearly believed in a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons and this reflects in the 
actions and policies that were undertaken.  The greatest consequence of Eisenhower’s belief in 
the power of tactical weapons was the creation of the New Look policy and the pentomic 
military.  The creation of the pentomic military represents the single-most influential factor 
behind the United States’ subsequent nuclear threats against China because it made the pentomic 
military the only military option available to confront China. 
Instead of a product designed to avoid war, the pentomic military was meant to assure 
that the United States military could successfully obtain its objectives, whether that be defense 
commitments, or in the case of Korea, preventing the loss of the Korean peninsula.  Several 
times during the first months of 1953, Eisenhower, Dulles and a majority of the administration 
believed nuclear weapons were the only practical military solution available to the United States 
that would guarantee a successful outcome in a conflict with China over Korea.  Both 
Eisenhower and Dulles preferred that nuclear weapons be used in a limited, tactical capacity, and 





Preparing for a Second Korean War 
 
In October, 1953, with the armistice only three months old, the administration was 
already considering its options should the cease-fire fail.  Nuclear weapons were again 
recognized as a key and necessary component to any military action on the peninsula, either as a 
means of securing an evacuation of friendly forces or to halt a Chinese offensive.  The concerns 
of the administration over using nuclear weapons in Korea echoed those previously mentioned 
during the war.  Would the United States’ allies understand the US position and the necessity for 
using nuclear weapons and would the Soviets respond with their own nuclear strikes in Korea 
and Japan?  Though there had been no formal discussion with the United States allies on the use 
of nuclear weapons against China in a situation of renewed hostility, John Dulles felt the 
American allies would, in this case, understand the US position on using nuclear weapons.112  
Eisenhower had his reservations about the allies’ acceptance of US nuclear policy and thought 
they had yet to “fully grasp the import of atomic warfare,” even though, in his opinion, the 
American public had accepted the reality of nuclear war.  Dulles’ solution to overcoming allied 
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resistance to nuclear weapons was that the United States should share nuclear technology and 
weapons.113 
The administration’s concerns prompted contingency planning for a renewed Korean 
war.  As part of that planning, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson requested pre-
authorization to use nuclear weapons should it be deemed necessary.  The secretary also sought 
immediate permission to begin planning for a regional nuclear war in Southeast Asia, requesting 
a list of strategic targets in Manchuria. 114  While the JCS and Wilson may have thought the 
extensive use of nuclear weapons was a military necessity, there were dissenting opinions from 
the State Department. 
 After analyzing the JCS proposal, the Director of Policy Planning, Robert Richardson 
Bowie, criticized the JCS plan as too vague and worried that nuclear attacks on Manchuria would 
back the Soviets into nuclear retaliation against United Nations forces in Korea or Japan.115  
Secretary Dulles also raised his concerns with the JCS plan.  The JCS plan for renewed warfare 
in Korea very much resembled the JCS plan for ending the stalemate earlier that year.  That plan 
called for nuclear strikes on both tactical and strategic targets throughout Korea and mainland 
China.  Dulles objected that the JSC plan involved general war with China, and even the Soviet 
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Union, the results of which would place the United States in an extremely isolated position with 
the rest of the world, as well as endangering a major US ally in the Pacific, Japan.  The secretary 
also thought the JCS plan would have threatening implications for the French in Indochina.  He 
felt the Chinese would send aid and personnel into that region to fight the French as a retaliatory 
measure against the United States.116 
 Dulles had his own plan for dealing with China, and it too, involved nuclear strikes.  
Unlike the JCS plan, however, Dulles’ plan limited nuclear strikes to the Korean peninsula as 
well as the seizure of the offshore islands (including Hainan) and the blockade of the Chinese 
coast.  The Secretary of State argued that what the JCS wanted was a “total victory” over China, 
and the JCS plan automatically assumed general war from the beginning.  If fighting were to 
occur in Korea, Dulles wanted to fight for victory in Korea, not over China.  Furthermore, Dulles 
saw dangers in the JCS plan, in allowing the military to decide before a crisis that it would fight 
a general war.117  The secretary was also wary of Wilson’s request for pre-delegation.  He 
worried that a field commander would conduct a nuclear strike without presidential 
authorization.  The president’s response to these concerns was quite clear.  Orders for nuclear 
strikes could only come from Washington, and not by a field commander.  Eisenhower was 
adamant there would be limitations on the use of nuclear weapons.  Such weapons would not be 
                                                          
116 Memorandum of Discussion at the 173d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 Korea Volume XV, Part 2, eds John P. Glennon and Edward C. Keefer, (Washington D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 1636-1645. 
117 Memorandum of Discussion at the 173d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 3, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 Korea Volume XV, Part 2, eds John P. Glennon and Edward C. Keefer, (Washington D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 1636-1645. 
48 
 
used for small incursions and border incidents, but would be reserved for a major attack by the 
Chinese. 118 
 Eisenhower claimed not to have seen much difference between the JCS plan and Dulles’ 
plan, just that the goals were different.  The president focused his attention on not wanting to 
repeat the experience from a year earlier, when the military fought in Korea under several 
operational constraints such as restrictive rules of engagements and sanctuaries from attack.  The 
JCS plan was much more aggressive and Eisenhower favored that one out of the two plans.119 
This is a telling exchange within the NCS, and reveals much about Secretary Dulles’ 
thinking regarding nuclear weapons.  The State Department plan presented by Dulles used 
nuclear weapons, just as the JCS plan.  The Dulles plan differed from the JCS plan by the 
considerable reduction of the nuclear deployment.  Instead of extensive attacks on Korea and 
much of China, as the JCS envisaged, the Dulles plan limited nuclear strikes to the Korean 
peninsula alone.  Even Dulles’ employment of conventional forces left much of China untouched 
(with the exception of Hainan), resorting instead to seizing islands and blockading the coast. 
 The contingency planning for post-Korean War hostilities reveals again how Eisenhower 
believed that nuclear weapons represented the only option for confronting China without 
escalating a limited war scenario to general war.  The discussion over these plans also revealed 
the conflict between the president and the US military regarding the intensity of any nuclear 
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response.  The military favored widespread strategic attacks geared toward general war.  
Eisenhower, along with Dulles, continued to favor a very limited application of nuclear weapons, 
essentially a tactical application, focused more on winning a brief, localized engagement and 
avoiding general war or retaliatory attacks against Japan or the French in Indochina.  These 
discussions also illustrate the continuing struggle to cope with allied rejection of American 
nuclear policy.  Though Eisenhower may have believed and wanted tactical nuclear weapons to 
be viewed as just another conventional weapon in the American inventory, he did not treat them 
as such, as seen by his refusal to allow pre-delegation for nuclear weapons use, and his insistence 
on maintaining tight control over when, where and how to use nuclear weapons. 
 Throughout the Korean War, outwardly, tactical nuclear weapons wielded little influence 
in military policy or ending the war.  Behind the scenes, however, nuclear weapons dominated 
discussions on how to end the war, and afterwards on how to fight the Chinese in a renewed 
Korean War.  Nuclear weapons presented a challenging dichotomy for the Eisenhower 
Administration.  In the president’s opinion, nuclear weapons were required for any successful 
military conclusion to the Korean War.  Yet, using nuclear weapons threatened to destroy the 
allied alliance and risked general war with the Soviet Union.  Acutely aware of allied attitudes 
against both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the administration found itself constrained 
far more by its allies than any technological issues, or even any reprisals from the Soviet Union. 
Eisenhower refused to act against these attitudes, placing the cooperation of the allies 
over the military considerations for ending the war.  The president deemed the political cost of 
using nuclear weapons too high.  Having the European alliance “go to pieces” as Secretary Smith 
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described it, at the very moment when the United States could find itself fighting general war 
with the Soviet Union was a scenario Eisenhower refused to risk.  As Eisenhower succinctly 
stated, the United States needed it allies, and refraining from using nuclear weapons and possibly 





CHAPTER THREE: EISENHOWER FACES CRISIS AND 
CONFRONTATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS 
 
Historians, in general, define Eisenhower’s nuclear policy in terms of strategic deterrence 
against a nuclear-armed Soviet Union.  Even when tactical nuclear weapons are acknowledged, 
they are mostly placed in a context subordinate to strategic applications.  Nina Tannenwald, for 
example, argues that the Eisenhower Administration’s creation of the pentomic military, the 
incorporation of tactical weapons into military policy, the threat to use tactical nuclear weapons 
and the subsequent effort to convince the American people that nuclear weapons were no 
different than conventional weapons, was an attempt to generate support and credibility for a 
strategic policy of massive retaliation directed at the Soviet Union.120  Instead, this chapter will 
demonstrate that Eisenhower’s consideration to use nuclear weapons against China was derived 
from the combination of choices to contain China and the creation of the pentomic military.  The 
ultimate goal in confronting China with nuclear weapons was to assert regional control over the 
Taiwan Straits area rather than for strategic factors directed at the Soviet Union. 
 
Laying the Groundwork for Nuclear Confrontation: Establishing a China Policy 
 
The Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the rise of Mao-Zedong created a 
strong, centrally controlled government in China.  The Eisenhower Administration felt the 
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Chinese government, acting under the heavy influence of nationalism and communism, would 
compel Communist China to eventually make attempts to reclaim historically Chinese territories 
that allies of the U.S. held or protected.121  Concerned over the influence of China on the Asian 
continent, US policymakers believed that the United States would have to maintain a permanent 
presence in Asia.122 
The relationship between the Soviet Union and China further complicated efforts to 
construct a policy.  In 1950, Mao Zedong aligned the People’s Republic of China with the Soviet 
Union, forming the Sino-Soviet Alliance.  The president and Dulles knew that there was little 
common ideological ground between the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China.  
Furthermore, the president did not believe in the imminent threat of the Chinese being dominated 
by the Soviet Union.123  Discord between the two nations represented the greatest threat to the 
Sino-Soviet alliance.  The administration, however, believed that external threats to the two 
communist nations would override any internal issues between them and unify the two 
powers.124 
The administration settled on a policy of bolstering the non-communist, Asian nations 
with economic, political and military aid in an effort to contain the expansion of Chinese 
influence.  Additionally, the United States would actively seek opportunities to degrade and 
impair the Sino-Soviet alliance such as continuing non-recognition of the People’s Republic of 
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China in the United Nations while recognizing the Republic of China.125  A mutual defense 
treaty was signed with South Korea in 1953, and in September, 1954, a mutual defense 
organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, was created.  Furthermore, the United 
States and the Republic of China initiated the diplomatic process of creating a mutual defense 
treaty between the two nations.126 
The decision to continue confrontation served as one of the most influential factors 
explaining why the Eisenhower Administration undertook active consideration to use nuclear 
weapons against China.  The administration felt that easing China policy contained the risk of 
further conflict with Mao, while direct confrontation with China contained a high political and 
military cost.  The middle road, containment built upon alliances, provided the most efficient and 
economical means of curbing Chinese influence in Asia.  These alliances, however, required a 
military commitment from the United States.  As seen earlier, Eisenhower had turned to nuclear 
weapons, tactical nuclear weapons in particular, to make the US military a viable force for 
defending the United States and its allies.  Reliance on tactical nuclear weapons meant that any 
military assistance to an ally, such as the Republic of China during its confrontation with the 
People’s Republic of China, would involve the potential for nuclear war. 
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The First Taiwan Straits Crisis: Preparations 
 
When Chiang Kai-Shek retreated from mainland China and occupied Taiwan, the 
Nationalist military continued to hold a series of tiny islands located in and around the Taiwan 
Straits area.  Known as the offshore islands, these islands consist of a series of separate and 
distinct archipelagos between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.  The archipelagoes 
most contested between the two sides were the island of Quemoy (of the Quemoy archipelago), 
the island of Matsu, and the archipelagos of the Dachens and the Penghus.  Quemoy and Matsu 
are located very close to the Chinese mainland, especially Quemoy, which resides a mere seven 
kilometers from the mainland.127  Chiang Kai-shek placed a high value on the islands for he 
hoped to use Quemoy as a jumping-off point in an attempt to retake mainland China.128 
Washington preferred to have Chiang defend the islands himself.129  The military was 
divided over the strategic importance of the offshore islands.  In late July, 1953, the navy 
classified Quemoy and Matsu as militarily necessary to the Nationalists for the defense of 
Taiwan, while the Dachens were ruled unnecessary.130  The JCS thought differently, and in an 
August, 1953 assessment, ruled that the islands were not required for the defense of Taiwan.  
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There was universal agreement, however, that the islands possessed considerable political value 
and were indispensable to Nationalist morale.131 
The administration worried that the offshore islands could become the center of a crisis.  
Ambassador to the Republic of China, Karl L. Rankin, in February 1954, expressed his concerns 
over not just the islands, but over the administration’s Chinese policy as a whole.  Regarding the 
islands, Rankin feared that the PRC could use the islands to test the United States’ retaliation 
policy.  The ambassador felt he had received little information regarding Chinese policy as well 
as feared that eventually, Chiang would attack the mainland, and that the PRC would exploit the 
issues between the Republic of China and the United States.132  The CIA also identified the 
offshore islands as a point through which the PRC could provoke the United States.  In its March 
National Intelligence Estimate, Communist China was predicted to conduct raids on the offshore 
islands, but that its primary efforts against the United States and Taiwan would be economic and 
political.133 
By the summer of 1954, the administration’s concerns grew to the point that Eisenhower 
and the NSA sought to take pre-emptive actions to discourage Chinese attempts to exploit the 
islands.  Early in June, the president approved a plan that a small portion of the Navy’s Seventh 
                                                          
131 Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting 
Secretary of State, August 3, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954 China and Japan, Vol. XIV, Part 1, eds John P. Glennon, 
David W. Mabon and Harriet Schwar, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 240-
241. 
132 Rankin to the Deputy Assistant Sec. of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Dumright) Feb. 20, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954 
China and Japan, Vol. XIV, Part 1, eds John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon and Harriet Schwar, (Washington D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 362-364. 
133 National Intelligence Estimate - Communist Courses of Action in Asia through Mid-1955, March 15, 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954 China and Japan, Vol. XIV, Part 1, eds John P. Glennon, David W. Mabon and Harriet Schwar, 
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 389-396. 
56 
 
Fleet would visit the Dachen Islands, an action specifically intended to communicate to the 
People’s Republic of China the United States’ concern regarding the offshore islands.134  During 
the August 18 NSC meeting, both China policy and the offshore islands were discussed.  Special 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler asked if the United States 
should extend the parameters of U.S. obligation to defend offshore islands outside the 
Pescadores (Penghus).  The opinion of the JCS was that all the Nationalist-held islands should be 
held.  Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Arthur Radford felt that the United States “could not afford 
to lose any more ground in the Far East.”  Eisenhower’s position was that the United States 
should “go as far as possible to defend them without inflaming world opinion against us.”  The 
Department of Defense was directed to deliver a report by September 29 on U.S. options should 
Communist China attack any of the offshore islands.135 
An assessment of American policy regarding the offshore islands was compiled by the 
State Department on August 20, which determined that the United States was not officially 
committed to defending the islands.  Nor had the Eisenhower Administration, up to that date, 
taken an official stance on the islands.  The only official actions taken were the visitation of 
members of the Seventh Fleet, once in May, and again on August 19 of that year.136  Less than a 
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week later, Dulles issued a statement warning China of possible US action should the offshores 
be attacked.137 
Just days after the Seventh fleet visited the Dachens, the Taiwanese government 
reiterated its concerns over PRC attacks against the offshore islands.  Though Chiang had 
mentioned the islands before, concern this time coincided with a series of statements from the 
PRC calling for the liberation of Taiwan.138  During the month of August, Chiang Kai-Shek 
moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy Island and 15,000 troops to Matsu, instantly raising the stakes 
of any crisis over the offshore islands.139  Toward the end of August, British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden relayed his concerns through the British embassy that the West faced losing more 
prestige over the offshore islands.  Apparently worried over the French failure to defeat 
communist forces in Indochina, the prime minister stated that England would support a strong 
military stand over the islands, but cautioned that such a policy should be flexible in order to 
avoid committing the United States to permanently defending the islands.140 
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The First Crisis: Hostilities Begin 
 
On September 3, 1954 China initiated an artillery barrage against the main island of the 
Quemoy archipelago.  The United States gauged Chinese motivations for the attack as ranging 
from a full scale invasion of Taiwan, an invasion of the offshore islands, or a test of American 
policy. During the first few days of the crisis, the administration struggled to determine the 
actual intent of the shelling.  Rankin reported that there was risk of an imminent attack on 
Quemoy, and the JCS certainly did little to discount that possibility.141  The intelligence 
community, however, stood by their original pre-crisis assessment that the People’s Republic of 
China was testing American policy.142 
The majority of the JCS considered the islands “important but not essential” to the 
defense of Taiwan while the minority opinion advocated active participation in the defense of ten 
offshore islands, including Quemoy.  The JCS was again in agreement that the offshore islands’ 
political value outweighed any military value (or lack, thereof) and for that reason, the islands 
might have to be defended, regardless of their lack of military importance.  Military action to 
protect Quemoy, in the opinion of the JCS, would require military action against mainland 
China.143 
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Dulles, too, believed Quemoy should be defended.  The secretary was in Manila for a 
SEATO organizational meeting and wired back to the United States expressing his opinion that 
the island should be defended with American aid, but only if the U.S. deemed it feasible.  The 
secretary thought the situation in Quemoy could turn into another Dien Bien Phu, where the 
French suffered a humiliating and devastating defeat at the hands of communist forces in 
Indochina.  Dulles saw an opportunity to reverse the prestige gained by Communist China if 
Quemoy could be held.144 
Prestige or the loss of prestige for the US should the islands fall to the Chinese, was a 
driving element of the crisis.  The president, then in Denver, recognized and identified the 
critical role of the islands in maintaining US prestige during a phone briefing with the Under-
Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith.  Much of the administration agreed with the 
CIA’s assessment of Chinese motivation for attacking the island, that Mao was probing 
American resolve over Taiwan and the offshore islands.  Lack of action on behalf of the United 
States, according to the CIA, could lead the People’s Republic of China to proceed with actual 
assaults on one or more of the offshore islands.145 
The first indication of Soviet reaction over the incident occurred early in October, when 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev spoke from Beijing supporting the Chinese.  The 
administration, however, dismissed the possibility of the Soviets going to great lengths to 
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confront the US over the offshore islands.  The American ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
Charles E. Bohlen, cabled the day after Khrushchev’s speech stating that he did not think the 
Soviets were ready to risk war over the People’s Republic of China or the offshore islands, but 
also warned not to take the premier’s statements lightly.146  John Dulles agreed, calling 
Khrushchev’s statements “bluster.”147 
The administration devised a diplomatic effort, to be initiated in the United Nations by 
New Zealand, to demilitarize the islands.  Eisenhower, Dulles, other administration members, as 
well as the administrations of New Zealand and Great Britain all felt China would reject any 
proposal that kept the offshore islands out of reach.  Equally as disruptive to the proposal was 
Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands.  All parties involved counted on the Mao’s rejection of 
the proposal, its real intent to give the United States the moral high ground in the crisis, should 
hostilities erupt between the US and China.148 
While the State Department pursued the New Zealand proposal, work on the mutual 
defense treaty with the Republic of China moved forward.  The treaty was signed between the 
United States and the Republic of China on December 2, 1954.  The provisions of the treaty 
included the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghus) and included an ambiguous clause 
covering any territory held by the Nationalists and considered strategically important by both 
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signatory nations.149  The Nationalists had tried to include most of the offshore islands in the 
protective sphere, but the United States would not agree to it.150  Furthermore, the US and the 
Republic of China agreed that any major action against the PRC required consultation and 
approval from the United States.151 
In December, Eisenhower advised the Nationalists against placing more troops on the 
offshore islands.152  One month later, communist Chinese forces seized the offshore island of 
Yijiangshan, near the Dachens, on January 18, 1955.  The next day, Eisenhower presented a plan 
to Congress that evacuated the Dachens, but added Quemoy and Matsu to the American defense 
perimeter.153  Eight days later, Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, granting the president 
the right to use force to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores and any related positions currently held 
by the Nationalists.154  The imprecise nature of the resolution gave Eisenhower the leeway to 
choose if and when to defend the offshore islands.  The US Navy helped to evacuate the 
Dachens, and by mid-February, Communist China occupied the island chain.155 
At this point, Eisenhower’s China and military policy decisions brought the United States 
to the point of actively considering nuclear attacks against China.  The United States alliance 
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with the Republic of China, particularly the mutual defense treaty, made the Chinese Civil War a 
part of American military policy.  The doctrine behind the pentomic military required the active 
planning, if not actual use, of nuclear weapons for any given situation.  Since nuclear weapons 
had been integrated into all military operations, no other alternative could have been utilized.  
Admiral Radford explained the US positon during the March 10, NSC meeting, “(It was the) JCS 
position that nuclear weapons would always have to be used.  Our whole military structure is 
built around this assumption.”156 
Nuclear weapons were deployed to the Far East theater in response to the crisis, and were 
integrated into military response planning.157  The JCS ordered the SAC to begin selecting 
targets in China.158  The official rules of engagement during those later stages of the crisis 
included a retaliatory nuclear strike option.  Eisenhower placed an exclusive restriction on this 
option, however, prohibiting its use without specific orders from the president himself.159  As the 
president had stated before, field commanders would not make nuclear strike decisions. 
Controlling nuclear weapons was just one aspect of nuclear policy that the president and 
the military would clash over.  The JCS favored military action on a strategic scale. Both Dulles 
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and Eisenhower believed that any military operation to protect Quemoy, or any of the offshore 
islands, required tactical nuclear weapons.  The two felt that only the limited application of 
nuclear weapons was all that was necessary.  Dulles would go so far as to specifically state that 
strategic weapons, or what he called weapons of mass destruction, were not necessary for 
confronting China.160 
 While the Eisenhower Administration grappled with potential war with China over the 
straits, China would make the first move to end the crisis.  During the Bandung Afro-Asian 
Conference in April, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai publically stated that China did not 
want war with the United States.  Eisenhower took advantage of the opportunity, and the United 
States and China entered into the Geneva talks, a series of ambassadorial meetings to discuss the 
repatriation of nationals and open dialogue with the intention of forestalling future crisis.161 
 
The First Crisis: An Assessment 
 
 The causes and resolution of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis remains a debated subject 
amongst historians.  Many focus on the ambiguity of Eisenhower’s policies, which made no 
straightforward commitment either to goals or specific actions.  As late as August, 1954, the 
administration did not make public any intention to defend the offshore islands.  This ambiguity 
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and lack of vocal commitment, according to Gordon Chang and He Di, had the complete 
opposite effect of deterrence and actually encouraged Mao Zedong to continue with operations 
against the Dachens as well as the artillery attacks against Quemoy.162  Countering opinions, 
such as those of Michael M. Sheng, blame Mao Zedong for underestimating the US commitment 
to defend the Republic of China and for taking actions that reinforced opinions in Washington 
about the aggressiveness of China.163 
Historian H.W. Brands is particularly critical of Eisenhower’s reliance on nuclear 
weapons during the straits crisis.  According to Brands, Eisenhower’s policy of Massive 
Retaliation drove the United States to risk what Brands called national suicide (through 
escalation) over interests of limited or no value, such as the offshore islands.  Brands 
characterizes Eisenhower’s decision making process as a hands-off procrastination, where 
Eisenhower waited for events during the Taiwan Straits’ crises to determine the use, or non-use, 
of nuclear weapons, rather than making the decision before such crises occurred.164 
The decision to defend the offshore islands was driven by fear of the consequences to 
American prestige should the islands fall to China.  This fear is best illustrated by the 
administration’s repeated concerns that the offshore islands could devolve into a repeat of the 
humiliating loss of the French at Bien Dien Phu.  The administration felt that the loss of the 
offshore islands could initiate a chain of events leading to the possible loss of Taiwan, thus 
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severely damaging the United States’ reputation as an ally in the Asian region.  Loss of prestige 
as an ally could embolden Communist China to continue to challenge the US in Asia.  In the 
eyes of the Eisenhower Administration, therefore, China would have to be confronted over the 
Taiwan Straits, otherwise, Communist China would increase its level of hostility toward the 
United States. 
Once the decision to defend the islands had been made, then the second component of 
Eisenhower’s policies wielded its influence.  By defending the islands, the administration had 
committed to utilizing the military.  In 1954, the pentomic divisional structure was still being 
implemented, but advanced enough along its development that no non-nuclear option was 
available.  Once committed to defending the offshore islands, the US nuclear element had 
become the only considered military option for resolving the crisis. 
 There is much more agreement amongst historians that US nuclear policy played little 
part in resolving the crisis.  Since China did not intend to take Quemoy or Matsu, then nuclear 
weapons could not have acted as a deterrent to Chinese expansion.165  Jian Chen also argues that 
Mao’s goal in the crisis was to emphasize to the world that the situation between China and 
Taiwan was a domestic issue, not an international one, and to protest the mutual defense treaty 
between the US and Taiwan.166  T.V. Paul argues the role of nuclear weapons in the crisis was 
diminished because there was no credibility behind the nuclear threats.167 
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 The decision to protect American prestige would certainly be called a strategic 
consideration, but the military options to protect the offshore islands were clearly aimed to be 
limited regionally.  The lack of concern over the Soviet Union’s reaction to events in the Taiwan 
Straits, and the open dismissal of any potential action by the Soviets, indicates that the 
Eisenhower Administration was not worried that the strategic disposition between the US and the 
Soviet Union would change over US actions in the Taiwan Straits. 
 For the Eisenhower Administration, tactical nuclear weapons assured military goals could 
be successfully obtained.  On repeated occasions before and during the crisis, the administration 
felt that only nuclear weapons could defend United States interests.  Only nuclear weapons could 
protect South Korea from a renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula.  Only nuclear weapons 
could protect Taiwan and the offshore islands from Chinese invasion.  Tactical nuclear weapons 
allowed the United States to retain the capability of direct military confrontation, should the 
administration choose that option. 
 The crisis further illustrated the difference of opinion between Eisenhower, Dulles and 
the US military over the nature of nuclear weapons in American policy.  The US military thought 
of nuclear weapons as a weapon to win general war, in this case, overwhelming strategic defeat 
of China.  The possibility that the US would fight a limited war, for limited goals, seemed to 
escape most of the military leadership.  For Eisenhower and Dulles, however, tactical nuclear 
weapons were a means of achieving regional goals within limited war by applying just enough 




Between the Crises 
 
In the years between the first and second straits crises, the Eisenhower Administration 
continued to develop the pentomic military.  In the eyes of the administration, the development 
and integration of tactical nuclear weapons considerably improved the capability of the US 
military, and tactical nuclear weapons were distributed around the world, particularly to Europe, 
Asia and the West Pacific.168  Nuclear weapons deployments in Asia rivaled those in Europe.  
Regulus nuclear missiles were dispatched to Guam between September and November, 1957. 169  
In January, 1958, the USAF’s 17th Tactical Missile Squadron, using Matador missiles armed 
with nuclear warheads, arrived in Taiwan.  In December, the 310th Tactical Missile Squadron 
deployed similarly-armed Matadors in South Korea.170   Honest John nuclear missiles, eight-inch 
nuclear howitzer ordinance and the 280mm atomic cannon were also deployed to South Korea. 
171  During the months of March and April, the United States conducted joint exercises with the 
Republic of China involving live-firing of Matador missiles.172 
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Nuclear cooperation with England, a carryover from the Bermuda conference, evolved to 
include the development of separate strategic and tactical planning agreements between the 
United States and Great Britain.173  The United States continued to conduct nuclear testing to 
improve and develop both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.174  Between 1955 and 1957, 
the United States conducted 145 nuclear test shots.  The vast majority of these tests, 131, 
involved weapons development as opposed to civil defense engineering or peaceful applications 
of nuclear explosives.175 
In addition to the nuclear deployments, meant to act as a deterrent to China, the 
administration sought to minimize the risk of Chiang stationing large numbers of troops on the 
offshore islands and undertook an effort to convince Chiang to abandon them.  In April, 1955, 
Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robinson were 
dispatched to Taiwan with the goal of persuading Chiang Kai-Shek to at least reduce the number 
of Nationalist forces stationed on the offshore islands.  Not only did Chiang refuse, but in July, 
he moved an additional army division to Quemoy.  Later, over the objections of the United States 
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Military Assistance and Advisory Group, he increased the Nationalist presence on the island of 
Quemoy to 85,000 military personnel.176 
 
The Second Crisis: Preparing for Crisis and Confrontation 
 
 On August 23, 1958, the Chinese army commenced an artillery bombardment of Quemoy 
Island, thus starting a second crisis in the Taiwan Straits region.  Unlike the first crisis, this one 
involved a US military that had fully implemented the pentomic military program.  As a result, 
considerations for nuclear warfare against China were at their most intense than in any previous 
engagement in Asia. 
As seen in the CIA’s analysis of the first Straits Crisis, the Eisenhower Administration 
was very much aware that Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands placed the initiative for any 
future action toward the islands with the PRC.  The US commitment to defend Taiwan and the 
offshore islands meant that China could provoke an incident at any time of its choosing.  This 
situation forced the United States to factor the offshore islands into US policy planning.  To 
monitor the situation in the Taiwan straits, the USAF conducted a series of reconnaissance 
flights both by Republic of China aircraft and US aircraft over the Chinese coast. 
The first of these flights, using Nationalist pilots trained in the US, began in December, 
1957.  Four flights by Republic of China aircraft were flown, with the fourth shot down by 
PLAAF fighter aircraft.  The US itself flew two U-2 flights over eastern China, the last flight on 
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June 18, 1958.  These flights were looking for signs of Chinese preparations to invade the 
offshore islands or Taiwan itself.  No such preparations were seen during these flights.177  On 
July 17, though, Mao Zedong made the decision to begin shelling Quemoy.  Fighter units of the 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were moved to the coast during the final weeks of 
July. 178  At the same time, Republic of China and PLAAF aircraft engaged in a series of 
dogfights over the straits area.179  On August 20, Mao committed to the straits operation, set to 
begin on August 23.180 
The movement of the fighter aircraft did not escape notice by the United States, most 
likely detected by a U-2 mission flown on July 20.  The State Department quickly suggested that 
the US alleviate any worries the Nationalists might have over the PLAAF fighter deployment.  
As far as the State Department was concerned, the deployment did not indicate the prelude to 
major offensive action against the offshore islands.181  Chiang Kai-shek disagreed with the state 
department assessment and insisted that the US had not realized the true danger of an imminent 
PRC attack on the islands.182 
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In spite of Chiang’s pleas for increased assistance and direct action by the United States, 
the State Department never thought China would attack Taiwan, believing the Chinese realized 
that such action would guarantee US involvement.  As with the previous crisis, the State 
Department identified that aggressive Nationalist actions would give the PRC a tremendous 
propaganda advantage.  The State Department also thought China might exert pressure on the 
offshore islands while trying to avoid direct US action.  Such an action would force the US to act 
or the offshore islands would be placed in a situation as to “wither on the vine.”183 
Dulles felt that it was time the US incorporated the islands into the defensive sphere 
protected by the US military, reasoning that Chiang Kai-Shek had already integrated them into a 
vital component of Taiwanese defense (by stationing a large contingent of troops).  Eisenhower, 
however, still recognized that the islands posed no military value, but only had worth in 
preserving the morale of the Nationalists.184  The president was well aware that Chiang Kai-
shek’s deployment of 100,000 troops on the islands placed the United States in a difficult 
position, essentially forcing US policy to become dependent on the actions of the PRC.  The 
president saw the situation as a “war of nerves,” and was cognizant that a potential for general 
war existed.  Inaction on the islands situation, Eisenhower felt, risked creating a condition 
leading to war.185 
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While refusing to commit US forces to defend the islands, the administration still took 
several actions to mitigate the risks of potential PRC action in the Taiwan Straits.  The US 
dispatched air force units to Taiwan, and the US Air Force was in the midst of formulating a plan 
to organize and deploy a composite air strike unit, comprised of both nuclear and conventional 
tactical aircraft, to Taiwan.186  A near unanimous decision by the president’s cabinet approved 
using nuclear weapons to prevent China from isolating or attacking the offshore islands.  The 
early plan called for 10-15 kiloton strikes on airfields in the coastal Amoy region (Xiamen).  If 
that did not force the Chinese to withdraw or halt their operations, then nuclear strikes against 
the mainland would expand.187 
Certain members of the State Department were very concerned about the JCS assessment 
that nuclear strikes would be necessary to defend the islands.  Dulles was contacted by Gerard C. 
Smith, the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, suggesting the United States re-
examine its commitment to the offshore islands if a non-nuclear method of defending the islands 
could not be found.  Smith suggested that Dulles convince the JCS to “urgently” consider non-
nuclear, localized defense of the islands.188  Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter also 
expressed concerns over JCS opinion that nuclear strikes used to repel any PRC attack could 
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result in nuclear retaliation against Taiwan, Okinawa or elsewhere.  Herter felt the PRC could be 
convinced not to conduct any action against the offshore islands if the US issued a warning via 
the Soviet Union.189 
The State Department continued through the month of August to examine and prepare US 
options for a confrontation with the PRC.  It did not think Chiang Kai-shek could be convinced 
to abandon the islands.  Nor did the State Department believe evacuation was a good strategy.  
The department feared that a Nationalist withdrawal from the islands would undermine the US 
position in the Far East and force the Nationalists into attacking China, resulting in a devastating 
counterattack by the PRC that could end in the loss of Taiwan.  Additionally, the State 
Department did not think a withdrawal would ease tensions, since the PRCs avowed goal was to 
take Taiwan.190 
The possibility that nuclear weapons could be used against China continued to haunt 
State Department thinking.  According to the JCS, the islands could be supplied without using 
nuclear weapons, but only with difficulties.  The military remained staunch in its assertion that 
defending the islands required the use of nuclear weapons.191  The State Department still hoped 
that warning the PRC might be enough, and requested that the US embassy in Poland ask for a 
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renewal of the Warsaw talks as soon as possible.192  While the State Department worked for a 
diplomatic solution, the military continued with its preparations.  By mid-August, SAC ordered 
five of its B-47 bombers, stationed on Guam, to prepare for nuclear attacks against mainland 
China.  Additionally, SAC alerted its units to prepare targeting Chinese cities, should the crisis 
escalate to general war.193 
On August 22, the State Department agreed to a number of actions the US could take (or 
already had) to alleviate tensions in the straits.  In addition to adding an aircraft carrier to the 7th 
Fleet, the State Department agreed to have the 7th conduct naval exercises near the straits (but not 
in the straits), have Admiral Felix Smoot visit the offshore islands, increase the number of 
fighters on Taiwan and increase the flow of supplies to the offshore islands.  Additionally, the 
US would consider increasing the amount of military equipment on the offshore islands, and 
increase shipping to Taiwan.194  These actions, designed to deter the Chinese and prevent a 
repeat of the previous crisis, could not be implemented in time, as the Chinese army began 
shelling Quemoy the next day. 
The Second Crisis Begins 
 
The military, already preparing for action in the straits, reacted quickly to the artillery 
attack.  The US Navy determined on August 24, that conventional forces would be sufficient in 
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the short term for defending the island, but if an attack against the islands were to be stopped, 
“effectively and quickly,” nuclear strikes against mainland China would be necessary.195  The air 
force, on August 26, initiated the first phase of its contingency plan, created in the wake of the 
first straits crisis.  This three-phase plan would culminate in its final phase with expanded air 
operations against China, conducted under the direction of SAC.196  On Taiwan, the USAF 868th 
Tactical Missile Squadron, with its Matador missiles, and the US Army Nike-Hercules missile 
batteries (air defense missiles capable of delivering conventional and nuclear warheads), both 
already on 24-hour alert status since January, 1958, were notified to prepare for pending 
action.197 
On August 27, Chiang Kai-shek requested from Eisenhower that the American military 
conduct strikes against mainland China in and around the Quemoy region, as well as provide 
protection for supply convoys to Quemoy.  More importantly, he asked the president to issue a 
public statement pledging the United States to defend the offshore islands.  But Chiang’s 
requests did not stop there.  He also suggested that Eisenhower change the command processes 
between the US president and Pacific command by asking for the US Far East commander be 
granted pre-delegated permissions to attack China without taking the time to receive orders from 
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Washington.198  One week following Chiang Kai-shek’s requests for a public pledge to defend 
the islands, the administration responded through US Taiwan Defense Command.  The 
administration affirmed US support for Taiwan, but twice reminded the Nationalist military that 
per the December, 1954 agreement, the United States expected the Republic of China to consult 
with the United States before taking any action against China.199 
Choosing a correct response to the Chinese attack required an accurate assessment of 
Chinese intentions behind the attack.  The administration felt secure in its belief that China was 
not planning an immediate invasion of the offshores.  The US intelligence services and the State 
Department both thought the latest attack was a means of testing US policy and not part of a 
military operation against Taiwan.  This assessment determined that neither China nor the Soviet 
Union wanted to risk general war.  More importantly, both the State Department and US 
intelligence predicted China would continue to increase pressure on the offshore islands until the 
US stepped in and guaranteed their safety.200  This assessment that the US must act or risk losing 
Taiwan, was universally shared by the military, the intelligence services, the State Department 
and the president. 
 Though the US military had already begun preparations for nuclear strikes before the first 
Chinese shell landed on Quemoy, military commanders knew of Eisenhower’s insistence on 
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controlling nuclear weapons.  Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke predicted that 
Eisenhower would resist the JCS pressure to use nuclear weapons at the outset of the crisis. On 
August 26, the president did just that and rejected the use of nuclear weapons for any early 
military action and emphasized that any strikes against China, if necessary, would be with 
conventional weapons.  Nuclear weapons would remain in reserve, to be used as a last resort.201  
Later, on August 29, the president reiterated his belief that the US should delay any use of 
nuclear weapons.202 
 Dulles began to have second thoughts about US reliance on the pentomic military, 
expressing his frustration with outside pressures, in the form of allied protests, interfering with 
US capabilities to enforce policy.  Clearly, if nuclear weapons were to be constrained by allied 
opinion, then the basis of American policy and the usefulness of the pentomic military fell into 
question.  The military was unified across all three branches on the utility of nuclear weapons, 
though Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor used Dulles frustration to point out that 
military flexibility (dual capability) did not suffer from such restrictions.  Dulles countered that 
such flexibility did not matter when nuclear weapons were the only means of balance against 
communist numerical superiority in Eurasia.203 
 Once again, the Eisenhower Administration was placed in the position of choosing 
between the allied alliance and the military utility of nuclear weapons.  For Eisenhower, Dulles 
and the military, their belief in the utility of nuclear weapons remained unchanged from before.  
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The president would not, however, sacrifice the support of American allies for the military gains 
of defending the offshore islands.  There was a limit to Eisenhower’s concessions to the allies, 
though.  If the offshores were seriously threatened, the president had decided to use tactical 
nuclear weapons, regardless of the effect on the United States relations with its allies. 
 Eisenhower preferred to have the Nationalists defend the offshore islands rather than rely 
on the United States.  The administration, therefore, decided that the United States Navy would 
help the Nationalists keep the islands supplied so that Nationalist troops could repulse any 
invasion attempt.  The administration focused its efforts on how the United States could ensure 
supplies reached Quemoy without provoking a greater response from China.  The answer was to 
have US warships partially escort supply ships bound for Quemoy.204 
 The Chinese relieved the pressure on the islands by suspending their bombardment for 
two days, beginning September 4.  Coincidentally, on that same day, Dulles provided a statement 
of American intent to protect Quemoy and Matsu, and though military preparations had been 
made, the president was withholding action for the time being.205  Two days later, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement calling for the resumption of Sino-American 
talks.  Eisenhower interpreted this as an acceptance of the July 28 offer to resume the Warsaw 
ambassadorial talks (a series of ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw, initiated in the wake of the 
first crisis).  The president responded publicly that he welcomed the Chinese acceptance.206  The 
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Warsaw talks began on September 15 and essentially signaled the end of the crisis, though 
shelling continued sporadically till the end of the year.207 
 
The Second Crisis Assessment 
 
 Several historians have criticized the Eisenhower Administration for resorting to nuclear 
weapons during the Taiwan Straits crises.  H.W. Brands argues that Eisenhower let events in 
Asia guide decision making, including nuclear policy, rather than taking the initiative and 
deciding in advance a course of action, claiming that Eisenhower’s inaction was an attempt to let 
crises resolve themselves. 208  Like a majority of historians, though, Brands addresses issues of 
national security from the point of view of conflict with the Soviet Union and not looking at 
nuclear policy as a means of exerting local control.  As seen earlier, the Eisenhower 
Administration had, in fact, tried very much to have a policy in place to address crises in the 
Taiwan Straits region.  In 1954, Eisenhower recognized the threat of crisis over the offshore 
islands, but events overtook the administration’s planning.  By 1958, however, the US military 
had extensive policy plan in place and aimed at generating a strong, localized response to 
Chinese attacks on the offshore islands.  The key instrument to the administration’s response to 
both crises was utilization of tactical nuclear weapons. 
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Appu Soman is also critical of the Eisenhower Administration for its reliance on nuclear 
weapons to defend the offshore islands.  For Soman, Eisenhower placed the United States in a 
position of either fighting a nuclear war or surrendering the offshore islands and shattering the 
faith of US allies in the protective merits of the American “nuclear umbrella.”  The 
administration’s view of nuclear weapons, according to Soman, was merely an efficient means of 
accomplishing a military goal and failed to recognize that the American public, along with US 
allies, did not view nuclear war as an acceptable means of defending the islands, especially given 
the low political value of the islands in world opinion.209  Craig, in a similar argument, cites 
Eisenhower nuclear policy as eliminating the United States options for limited war, and linking 
global war to even the smallest of crises.  Contrary to Brands, however, Craig views 
Eisenhower’s “wait and see” approach as a positive element in Eisenhower’s policies, and credits 
that ambiguity as a key factor in allowing the United States to avoid war with China and the 
Soviet Union.210 
While Eisenhower did refrain from publicly threatening China with nuclear weapons, 
behind the scenes, the United States military had significantly increased its nuclear preparations 
to the point of near instantaneous deployment, hardly a casual “wait-and-see” approach, 
suggesting that the administration preferred to act after Chinese action.  The administration, 
instead, acted before the crisis had even begun, rapidly activating tactical nuclear units in the 
region to prepare for the worst possible scenario, a Chinese invasion of the offshore islands.  
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Once the US was ready for the worst case scenario, the administration sought to achieve a 
diplomatic resolution for the crisis. 
A growing theory in nuclear policy history is the role of public opinion in constraining 
US nuclear weapons utilization.  T.V. Paul, for example, cites world opinion as the primary 
restraint preventing the US from using nuclear weapons during Korea and the Taiwan Straits 
Crisis.211  While this is an appropriate conclusion for why nuclear weapons were not used during 
the Korean War, the evidence that the US did not use nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Straits 
crises due to the restraining influences of the public and US allies remains scant.  First, the 
Taiwan Straits crises had little in common with the Korean War.  Aside from the political value 
of the islands, there was no military investment of troops as was the case during Korea.  Second, 
much of the administration believed that Chinese goals during both crises did not include the 
invasion of Taiwan.  And third, during both cases, the Eisenhower Administration tended to 
dismiss the threat of Soviet intervention, so long as US actions did not threaten the national 
security of the People’s Republic of China.  In short, it could be reasonably argued that nuclear 
weapons were not used because neither crisis exhibited the military or political intensity to 
warrant their use against China, and not because public opinion had dictated they would not be 
used. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: KENNEDY AND THE END OF AN ERA 
 
In January, 1961, John F. Kennedy took the office of president, a position held for eight 
years by Eisenhower.  The new president entered the decade intent on reforming both China and 
nuclear policies.  In the thirty-three months that he served as president, however, Kennedy would 
change very little in either China policy or nuclear policy.  Kennedy encountered many of the 
same factors and variables that influenced both China and nuclear weapons policy under the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and, just like the preceding administrations, Kennedy 
found himself turning to tactical nuclear weapons for containing China. 
 Many historians have adopted the viewpoint that the Kennedy Administration used 
nuclear weapons policy in an attempt to control China’s strategic ambitions.  Michael Schaller, 
for example, argues Kennedy pursued the Limited Test Ban Treaty(LTBT) with the Soviet Union 
in an effort to contain China’s nuclear ambitions, and therefore, contain China in Asia.212  Chang 
also supports this theory, citing Kennedy’s motivations as an attempt to keep China, which he 
viewed as an uncontrollable element, from possessing nuclear weapons and upsetting the 
international order.213  While pursuit of the LTBT represented a strategic policy, what is often 
overlooked by historians is the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Kennedy’s China policy.  The 
research in this chapter will demonstrate that tactical weapons, though not utilized as much as 
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previous administrations, still served as an additional policy tool used by Kennedy to contain 
China. 
China Policy: The Kennedy Administration Assessment 
 
The Kennedy Administration began its term sharing the same Chinese policy goals as the 
Eisenhower administration, that of containment and disrupting the Sino-Soviet alliance.  The 
new administration even agreed that the best strategy for exploiting the Sino-Soviet divide was to 
engage the Soviet Union with a constructive policy while adopting a confrontational policy 
toward China.  Changes in the international environment, however, combined with the 
continuing threat of a new crisis with China, convinced the State Department and the JCS that it 
was time to reassess American China policy.  The findings of the reassessment determined that 
Communist China did not want improved relations with the United States.  For the most part, the 
Kennedy Administration felt that Eisenhower’s China policy and American military force had 
successfully contained China.214 
In spite of this assessment, the Kennedy Administration still found the preceding 
administration’s execution of policy to be lacking.  Kennedy’s advisors felt that United States 
did not possess the proper sense of urgency to forestall confrontations, that previous policy 
reacted to events rather than working to avoid conflict.215  Eisenhower’s policy centered too 
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much on preventing the collapse of the Nationalist government and did not possess clearly-
defined, long-term goals for coping with a permanent Communist China.216  It was this flaw in 
Eisenhower’s policy that the administration identified as the cause for US isolation from its allies 
in regards to China.217 
To address this deficiency in China policy, the administration would have to shift from 
the policy goal of restoring the Nationalist government to a goal that accepted the long-lasting 
existence of Communist China.  Any belief that Communist China would collapse, either caused 
externally by the Nationalists, or internally by elements dissatisfied with the Communist 
revolution, was in the administration’s eyes, unfounded and unrealistic.  Even in the unlikely 
event of considerable disruption within China, it was expected that the Soviet Union would 
intervene to prevent China from failing, no matter that there was a rift in relations between those 
two nations.218 
Accepting a permanent Communist China meant accepting the admission of the People’s 
Republic of China into the United Nations.  Kennedy’s advisors predicted Chinese admission to 
the UN as inevitable and likely to happen within Kennedy’s first term, especially if China 
became a nuclear power.  It was believed that the international community would want to include 
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China in the United Nations as a means of ensuring that nation’s compliance with international 
nuclear arms control treaties.219 
The rise of China as a nuclear armed power was one of three key issues Kennedy 
identified that would have to be addressed in formulating a policy.  The other two factors both 
involved the United States relationship with its allies.  The rate at which the nations surrounding 
China were strengthening, Kennedy felt, was too slow to adequately contain China.  Finally, the 
United States’ methods of containing China were harming the relationships between the US and 
its allies.220 
During previous administrations, containing China required only a small allocation of 
resources.  As China’s influence grew, however, more effort from the US would be required to 
maintain the status quo.  China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would further hamper this 
effort.  China’s first successful atomic test was expected to be a “watershed” event, comparable 
in magnitude to the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test.  Additionally, the administration predicted 
China would become more aggressive, in part, because it was thought Mao needed an external 
threat to maintain the Communist revolution, and partly because of the ideological differences 
between China and the United States.221 
The issue of recognizing China in the United Nations and the aggressive confrontations 
between the United States and China alarmed US allies.  The offshore islands served as a major 
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point of contention between the United States and the international community.  US allies feared 
what they called the “unpredictable risks” found within the US policy of supporting Chiang at 
the risk of war with Mao, and, possibly, the Soviet Union.  The longer the US maintained its 
current offshores policy, the harder the United States would find to disengage from that policy.  
The challenge facing the Kennedy Administration was convincing its allies to support the 
American position on China.  Without that support, the US could not pursue a long-term strategy 
of containing China.222 
The Kennedy Administration thought US defense of the offshores was part of a 
misguided policy protecting the wrong nations from China.  While Eisenhower policy focused on 
Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, Kennedy considered those nations as weaknesses for the US.  
Maintaining these nations as allies against China required “massive US aid”.  The administration 
feared that continued growth of Chinese power would lead to these nations becoming more 
accommodating toward China, especially if those nations felt the United States had lost the 
political will or military ability to protect them.223 
The administration’s assessment singled out the rift between the Soviet Union and China 
as having potential for advancing US China policy.  It was believed that the Soviet Union would 
fear a strong China, therefore, as China strengthened, the Sino-Soviet rift would intensify and the 
Soviet Union would become more amenable to cooperation with the United States.224  The call 
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for a more flexible China policy allowed the US to exploit any opportunity that presented itself 
to act on this fear and approach the Soviet Union about a joint policy toward China.225 
China Policy: The Administration’s Recommendations 
 
On considering China policy, the Kennedy Administration explored three options very 
similar to the options the Eisenhower Administration explored in 1953.  The actions considered 
ranged from full military enforcement to contain China to reducing the US strategic presence in 
the Pacific region.  The moderate option called for long term containment by strengthening 
Japan, India, Taiwan and Korea to act as balancing powers in Asia.226 
The administration quickly rejected direct confrontation for several reasons, many of 
which are the same reasons the Eisenhower Administration ruled out direct military 
confrontation.  Military encirclement required a staggering financial investment and drained the 
US military of valuable, and limited, resources.  The political price was deemed to be even more 
costly.  The European allies would refuse to participate in such a policy and the Asian-Pacific 
nations could be driven by US actions to embrace China.  Kennedy’s advisors felt encircling 
China with the US military would encourage China to adopt a more confrontational stance 
toward the US.  Whatever gains were to be had through direct confrontation would be temporary, 
at best.227 
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Reversing current policy and improving relations between the two countries was 
considered and just as quickly rejected.  The administration thought that accommodation with 
China granted the United States more flexibility to exploit the Sino-Soviet Rift.  By adopting a 
more accommodating policy, however, it was felt the international community would view the 
United States as leading from a position of weakness.  This appearance of weakness, as believed 
by the administration, would encourage China to expand its influence.228  This reasoning is 
identical to that of the Eisenhower Administration, when it too, thought that failure to act 
aggressively would invite China to expand its influence. 
The remaining option left for the United States followed a middle road between 
accommodation and direct conflict and became the preferred course of action.  Executing that 
policy involved disengaging from what was seen as “unproductive aspects” of current US policy 
but still providing clear proof of US determination to resist the expansion of Communist 
China.229  Additionally, this option would have to follow a narrow range of actions to avoid 
easing pressure on China, while not applying too much pressure and drawing the Soviet Union 
and China closer together.230 
The administration’s recommendations on strengthening the US position in the Pacific 
encompassed more aid for military, political and counter-subversive activities.  While all 
American allies were to be included, particular focus in the form of long-term aid would be 
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directed toward Japan and India.  The United States would also explore methods of using Asian 
nationalism to US advantage.  Finally, the United States would seek a means of placing 
responsibility for continued conflict on the People’s Republic of China. 231 
China Policy: Taiwan 
 
Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government on Taiwan proved to be extremely 
problematic for Kennedy.  Taiwan was a “wasting asset” as far as the administration was 
concerned.  Kennedy’s advisors predicted that the Nationalists on Taiwan would only weaken 
over time while Communist China would strengthen.  This would occur regardless of any action 
the US took to prevent it.  The United States would have to prepare itself for the possibility of 
the complete collapse of Taiwan, including its loss to China 232 
Much like the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration recognized the 
United States had a formal obligation toward Taiwan, an obligation from which it could not 
disengage without a significant loss of international prestige amongst the international 
community, especially its Asian allies.  Kennedy also recognized that if the Republic of China 
fell to the People’s Republic of China, the United States would again suffer a crippling blow to 
its international prestige and future efforts to contain international communism.  This risk led 
Kennedy to continue United States protection of the Nationalists on Taiwan, even though Taiwan 
no longer carried the same value for the United States as before.  The price of losing Taiwan far 
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outweighed any negative consequences from defending Taiwan.  The administration even 
considered a localized war worth the cost if it could frustrate China’s efforts to take Taiwan.233 
Continued support for Taiwan meant the administration would have to mitigate one of the 
most damaging elements of defending the Nationalists.  Chiang would have to be convinced to 
evacuate the offshore islands.  Kennedy would provide incentive for Chiang to abandon the 
islands by continuing military aid through the Military Assistance Program and by increasing US 
presence in Far East.  It was felt that modern missiles deployed on Taiwan, but under US 
military control, might also help to convince Chiang to abandon the islands.  Other incentives 
included an economic plan, underwritten by the US, for Taiwan and convincing other Asian 
allies (Japan, India) to provide support to Taiwan.234 
Historians have uncovered a range of reasons for why Kennedy chose to confront China, 
rather than the Soviet Union, regardless of the considerable evidence that such a choice could 
only lead to complications for the United States.  According to Gordon Chang, Kennedy’s 
decision was based on the president’s perception that China represented the greater threat to 
American interests, particularly in Asia.  Chinese behavior was confrontational and 
unpredictable, whereas Soviet behavior was more docile and thus more compatible with US 
goals.235 
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For Cohen, the decision to confront China rather than the Soviet Union was based on the 
combination of the dynamic of the Sino-Soviet split and domestic issues.  That a rift had 
developed between China and the Soviet Union meant that United States accommodating one 
side, would, through the existence of the split, harm the other.  By 1960, the Soviet Union 
represented the only nation that possessed the military power to threaten the United States.  
Therefore, Cohen argues, Kennedy felt the United States was better served seeking 
accommodation with the Soviet Union.  Cohen also points out that Kennedy faced domestic 
pressures from the China lobby and from anti-communist proponents.  Confronting China 
allowed Kennedy to appear strong against communism yet still seek accommodation with the 
Soviet Union.  By the same logic, maintaining a firm policy against China allowed Kennedy to 
silence criticism from those who supported Chiang and the Nationalist government.236 
Schaller credits Kennedy’s perception of China as an unpredictable element threatening 
the international order as a guiding factor in choosing a policy of confrontation.  Domestic 
issues, too, also influenced Kennedy’s decision, in a more indirect mode.  The vocal China 
Lobby, according to Schaller, tended to silence advocates for changing China policy, thereby 
reducing or eliminating any alternative, more peaceable, actions from being forwarded to the 
president.237 
While all of the above reasons are credible and supported, there is a common element that 
exists across three separate presidential administrations over thirteen years, that of US prestige in 
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the international order.  A common perception held by Kennedy and shared by his two 
predecessors identified unacceptable damage to the image of the United States should China gain 
Taiwan.  This fear that the loss of Taiwan would cripple the United States ability to project itself 
into international stage served as a driving force for confronting China. 
JFK and Tactical Nuclear Policy 
 
The administration entered its first year believing the United States defense policy was 
dangerously unbalanced in favor of nuclear doctrine.  Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert 
McNamara, thought that Eisenhower policy had been plagued by civilian advisors who placed 
too much emphasis on strategic force and first strike/counterforce planning while ignoring the 
role of deterrent force and second strike force capability.  Unlike the Eisenhower Administration, 
McNamara felt that tactical nuclear policy inhibited American warfighting capability and posed 
dangerous risks to the country.238 
McNamara believed the use of tactical nuclear weapons would confuse the enemy and 
alienate US allies.239  The utilization of tactical nuclear weapons would certainly lead to 
escalation in any scenario in which they were employed.  Tactical weapons, in McNamara’s 
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opinion, lacked military utility, and the United States was better served by changing the focus of 
US military policy from the pentomic military to non-nuclear operations.240 
Kennedy, however, disagreed, believing that tactical nuclear weapons still retained 
military utility.  The president’s counterproposal was to retain the tactical nuclear capability of 
the US military and strengthen its non-nuclear components.241  The United States would pursue 
the dual capability the US Army sought after losing its budget battles over the pentomic military 
during Eisenhower’s administration.  Strengthening the non-nuclear capability of the US 
military, however, did not stop the continued growth of the pentomic arm of the military.  Under 
Kennedy, tactical nuclear weapons production, which had risen considerably under Eisenhower, 
continued to rise and peaked under the Kennedy Administration.  Nuclear weapons testing and 
development also continued under Kennedy, culminating in 1962, the year with the most 
American nuclear tests than in any other year before or since.242 
The president had concerns, though, over defining the threshold for using nuclear 
weapons and found the lack of guidance on establishing that criteria frustrating.243  Kennedy 
believed the best policy rested with America’s allies, especially NATO.  The problem, he 
thought, was that many US allies had not modernized their military policies to include tactical 
nuclear weapons.  Kennedy’s answer to correct that shortcoming involved the United States 
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providing tactical nuclear training to its allies.244  As seen in his proposals, Kennedy clearly 
identified a distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.  Going 
against the advice of his defense secretary, Kennedy continued with Eisenhower’s military 
policy, modifying it only by strengthening some of the non-nuclear capabilities while increasing 
tactical nuclear ability.  The continued presence of the pentomic military combined with the 
administration’s decision to continue confrontation with China ensured that any future crisis 
would, once again, involve nuclear weapons. 
 
The Offshore Islands 
 
 The possibility of a third Taiwan Straits Crisis occupied Kennedy’s staff early in the 
administration.  By April, 1961, the State Department and the NSC warned that the offshore 
islands issue remained unresolved, and that the “fighting season” was approaching.245  The 
administration identified a requirement to develop contingency plans in case another straits crisis 
developed, noting that the president would need to determine which specific elements of the 
military would be utilized, as well as directing the diplomatic effort. 246 
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The Offshore islands contained a twofold danger in that the US could be dragged into the 
Chinese civil war and that China would continually use the islands against the US.  The 
commitment to defending the islands would only become harder over time, particularly since it 
would be extremely difficult to protect the islands without nuclear weapons.  The use of nuclear 
weapons, however, contained politically disastrous repercussions in the form of strenuous 
objections from America’s allies.  Kennedy, however, just as Eisenhower, could not separate 
nuclear weapons from the defense of the offshores since the administration felt that it was the 
ambiguous threat of nuclear retaliation, combined with the Soviet reluctance to defend China 
over the offshores, which served as a successful deterrent preventing the Chinese from taking the 
islands.247 
Abandoning the islands could not be considered, since the offshore islands were 
recognized both by the US and China as a critical element of Nationalist morale.  Yet, the next 
crisis, which the administration was convinced would happen, would be very difficult to obtain 
allied support for the US position.  In order to gain more international support for Taiwan, the 
United States would have to disengage from its obligation to defend the offshore islands.248 
Disengagement from the offshore islands proved to be very difficult given that neither 
Communist China nor Nationalist China could see any benefit in easing pressure on the islands.  
The disposition of the islands contained too much political value for both sides to allow either 
one to back down.  Maintaining pressure on the islands served both the Nationalists and 
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Communist China by continuing the civil war.  For the People’s Republic of China, the offshores 
were tied to Taiwan and considered an internal affair.  Additionally, the offshores islands served 
Mao Zedong, through their occupation by Chiang Kai-Shek, as a convenient means of 
antagonizing the United States. 249 
For the US to abandon the Offshores, Chiang would have to abandon the islands as soon 
as possible, and withdraw voluntarily.  To abandon the islands under duress of a crisis would 
make the US appear weak.250  Chiang, however, would not abandon the islands.  A policy 
procedure for convincing Chiang to abandon the islands was devised where the US would assure 
Chiang that the defensive agreements between the US and Taiwan remained, but encourage him 
to refrain from conducting offensive actions against the mainland from the islands.251  New 
assurances of commitment would also be offered, hinting that Chiang should evacuate the 
islands.  Should Chiang not evacuate the islands, the US would inform Taiwan that it would not 
participate in defending the offshore islands.252 
The administration also developed an alternative diplomatic plan for dealing with the 
offshores.  In the event of a new crisis, the issue would be brought before the United Nations and 
the United States would tie the fate of the islands to other issues with China.  The feeling within 
the administration was that if the islands could be addressed in the United Nations, it could 
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prevent a future crisis.  Utilizing the United Nations, though, contained some risk for the United 
States.  A UN resolution could call for evacuation of the islands; which Chiang would defy.  Nor 
could cooperation from Communist China be counted on, as it would certainly be defiant of any 
attempt to interfere with the status of the offshore islands.253 
The Kennedy Administration interpreted previous US policy during the Straits crisis as 
largely successful, identifying US military action as partially restraining Communist China 
during the 1954-1955 Crisis.  During the 1958 crisis the administration felt that US military 
action had completely restrained Chinese aggression against the offshores.254  In a future crisis, 
the administration believed China would escalate it to a level more intense than that of any 
previous crisis.  The increased risk to Taiwan placed an emphasis on the ability of Taiwan to 
defend itself, particularly the Taiwanese air force.  The condition of the Taiwanese air force 
worried the administration since it felt that the current planning failed to account for any attrition 
of Taiwanese air force by the PLAAF during a crisis, thereby leaving Taiwan open to attack.255 
The fear that a new crisis would leave Taiwan extremely vulnerable called for a new 
contingency plan.  This new plan would inform American allies of US determination to protect 
Taiwan and the offshore islands and publically reiterate the Dulles-Chiang statement from 1958 
to seek political resolution over military resolution.  Parts of the Warsaw negotiations would be 
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published to demonstrate US commitment to a peaceful process to resolution.256  Finally, the 
issue would be brought before the UN and the US would condemn the attacks before the UN 
General Assembly, as well as consider forming a working group with the UN to resolve the 
issue.257 
In summer, 1962, a Chinese troop movement along the coast caused alarm within some 
departments of the administration.  The intelligence community interpreted the movement as a 
prelude to another attack on the offshore islands, possibly in an effort pre-empt a Nationalist 
attack on the mainland.  It was believed China hoped to gain prestige amongst neutral Asian 
nations by instigating a new crisis.  Such action by China would provide a benefit by motivating 
an increase in domestic production and by testing the relationship between the United States and 
Taiwan.258  The State Department assessment differed from the intelligence community’s in that 
they did not believe the troop movement represented any offensive action by China, but felt the 
movement was for defense against any Nationalist attack on the mainland.259 
The international situation also seemed to present an opportune time for China to attack 
the offshore islands.  The United States had recently suffered the embarrassment of the failed 
Cuban invasion.  The situation in Vietnam had also improved for China, with the US 
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increasingly getting involved, and in the summer of 1962, the Viet Cong remained a strong 
military opponent.  And there was the continued lack of support for US offshores policy from 
American allies.  The timing and the perceived benefits gained by China led the administration to 
assume that Chinese activity was the prelude to an imminent attack, but not an actual invasion of 
the offshore islands.260 
 An offshores working group was formed to explore US options to deal with the pending 
crisis.  The scenarios explored ranged from a Chinese buildup on the mainland to a substantial 
military effort against the offshore islands, including amphibious operations.  The scope of 
responses varied depending on the degree of Chinese action.  Most recommendations provided 
material support for Taiwan, but placed the responsibility for direct military response on the 
Nationalists.  Direct military action by the United States would be initiated only if China began 
amphibious operations against the offshore islands.  This action would include non-nuclear 
strikes against the Chinese mainland.  If Chinese action included an invasion of Taiwan or the 
Penghus islands, then the US would honor its treaty obligations with Taiwan.  The working 
group advised that the president refrain from deciding on US policy until further action was 
taken by China.261 
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 A policy that depended largely on the Nationalist ability to defend itself concerned both 
Kennedy and McNamara.  Kennedy had asked specifically about comparisons of the Taiwanese 
air force against the PLAAF.262  McNamara expressed his concern over the vulnerability of the 
offshore islands, and asked under what conditions nuclear weapons would be required to defend 
the islands.  The JCS felt nuclear weapons were not necessary as long as China did not make a 
determined effort to take the islands.263 
Soviet reaction to American policy was factored into consideration.  The risk in 
American offshores policy lay in that a new crisis in the Taiwan Straits would pressure the 
Soviets to do or say something in an effort to avoid appearing weakened as the world’s 
communist leader.  American assessments of the Soviets determined they would not support 
China taking either Taiwan or the offshore islands.  In a crisis, the administration believed Soviet 
reaction would likely take the form of verbal support for China while seeking a means of 
averting conflict between the US and China.  The Soviets would also advise China to ease 
tensions, in order to avoid Soviet involvement in a straits crisis, especially if a US nuclear strike 
were imminent or a US-supported landing by Nationalists on the Chinese mainland.  It was 
believed the Soviets would privately inform the Chinese that they could not count on Soviet 
support if hostilities erupted between the US and China.264 
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The working group also explored the range of actions available to the US that would not 
trigger Soviet interference.  The group’s findings determined that the United States could safely 
perform several operations without Soviet reaction.  Among these actions included US Naval 
operations against the PLAAF and Chinese Navy within a three-mile limit of the mainland.  
Retaliatory bombardment and pursuit of PLAAF aircraft and retaliation against mainland targets 
near the straits were also deemed safe actions.  Soviet restraint was contingent, though, on 
whether the US action was meant to avoid a major defeat, and US action excluded the possibility 
of nuclear strikes.  If those contingencies were violated, then Soviet interference, up to and 
including direct involvement of the Soviet Air Force, was expected.265  American ambassador to 
the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman met with Soviet ambassador Anatolly F. Dobrynin to 
sound out the Soviet position on the offshores situation.  The meeting, however, ended 
inconclusively as Dobrynin deflected from the issue.266 
On June 27, 1962, Kennedy enacted one of the recommendations from the offshores 
working group by publicly stating he agreed with Eisenhower’s stance on the Taiwan Straits, as 
well as referencing his own remarks supporting the defense of the offshores made in October, 
1960.  He also tied the status of the islands to the fate of Taiwan and peace in the region.  In 
keeping with the findings of the 1961 study, Kennedy kept his statement vague as to any specific 
actions the US would take, instead emphasizing the defensive posture of US military forces in 
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the region.267  The fears of the administration were never realized since Mao did not attack the 
offshore islands.  The lack of a crisis meant that nuclear planning did not possess the intensity or 
activity of the two crises during the Eisenhower Administration.  A different crisis with China, 
though, would bring tactical nuclear weapons to the forefront of policy options. 
Nuclear Policy: The Chinese Nuclear Program 
 
 Under Eisenhower, the threat of nuclear armed China was a distant possibility, and then 
only with a large amount of aid from the Soviet Union.  The Kennedy Administration faced an 
entirely different situation, with a China capable of independently developing its own nuclear 
weapons.  A nuclear-armed China did not threaten US national security, nor was it thought China 
would engage in a nuclear first strike scenario.  The impact Chinese nuclear weapons would have 
on the Taiwan Straits situation was considered minimal as the administration did not think the 
Chinese could use its nuclear reputation to obtain the offshore islands.268 
Kennedy was more concerned about the effects of a nuclear-armed China on its 
neighboring countries in Asia.  Utilizing its nuclear strike capability, China could apply pressure 
to keep the United States from providing aide to Asian nations.  China could use nuclear 
weapons to force the acknowledgement by the rest of the world of China’s status as a world 
power.  A nuclear-armed China could impose nuclear blackmail against its neighboring countries 
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while demonstrating that US nuclear power was the true danger in Asia.  Asian nations, fearing 
two contentious nuclear powers in their midst, could seek a nuclear-free Asia.  China’s 
neighboring countries might add their support for admitting Communist China to the United 
Nations.  Chinese nuclear capability, by the implied threat of nuclear retaliation, raised the 
threshold for American nuclear use, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the US nuclear force.  
Chinese nuclear weapons would place a strategic burden on Asian nations, leading to more 
dependence on the United States, including a requirement for nuclear cooperation with the US, 
and an increased dependence on conventional military assistance.269  It was believed that fear of 
the Chinese nuclear program had led Taiwan to request nuclear weapons from the United 
States.270  The US reliance on tactical nuclear weapons could cause Asian nations to fear asking 
the US for help in a crisis, wary of a nuclear response to a scenario involving low levels of 
Chinese aggression.  Additionally, the more reliant the United States on tactical nuclear 
weapons, the more likely China and other Asian nations would insist on a nuclear free Asia.271 
 To forestall China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and avoid the substantial and 
detrimental effects that would occur to American policy, the administration explored several 
options to deal with the Chinese nuclear weapons program.  Diplomatic efforts would focus on 
bringing China into the fold regarding nuclear test ban treaties and international norms for 
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strategic weapons.  These diplomatic efforts, however, were entirely dependent on China’s 
willingness to participate.  Additionally, even if China complied with a nuclear test ban treaty 
after it its first successful nuclear test, it would not mitigate the damage suffered to the 
effectiveness of US nuclear forces. 
Aggressive, military options were then explored as a means of delaying the development 
of a Chinese nuclear weapon.  The JCS considered several covert actions to hamper or destroy 
the Chinese nuclear program.272  These actions ranged from using Nationalist commandos to 
attack the Chinese nuclear research facilities to employing a tactical nuclear weapon, either by 
US forces or Soviet forces.  The JCS predicted that using tactical nuclear weapons would lead to 
escalation and retaliation, as well as “strong criticism” from the international community.  Nor 
was Soviet cooperation for such an effort expected.273 
In spite of the anticipated negative reactions to direct military action against the Chinese 
nuclear weapons program, the administration still attempted to engage the Soviet Union in 
stopping the Chinese nuclear program.  In January, 1963, Ambassador Averell Harriman spoke 
with a Soviet representative about the Chinese program, both were in apparent agreement that 
the Chinese nuclear capability must be dealt with, either through a Test Ban Treaty or by threats 
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of “taking out” China’s nuclear facilities.274  Later that year, McGeorge Bundy met with Soviet 
ambassador to the US, Anatoly Debrymin, and attempted to get consensus on the Chinese 
program.  Debrymin, however, tied the issue to NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe, and used the 
meeting to object to the existence of the NATO multi-lateral force.275 
More conciliatory action was also explored, and these included moving American nuclear 
weapons away from China and increasing defensive, non-nuclear military forces in the region.  It 
was also recommended that the United States avoid the creation of a specific nuclear 
counterforce targeting Chinese nuclear capability, deploying medium ranged, ballistic missiles in 
Asia, or altering the US nuclear posture in Asia.276  The last recommendation would have 
marked a reversal in a trend in new nuclear deployments started by the Kennedy Administration 
in 1961, when the air force deployed new Mace tactical nuclear weapons systems in Okinawa as 
part of a modernization of nuclear weapons systems in Asia.277 
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Nuclear Policy: China and India 
 
After the failure to secure Soviet cooperation to destroy the Chinese nuclear weapons 
program, Kennedy still looked upon tactical nuclear weapons as a means of containing China 
and maintaining the United States’ defense commitments to its Asian allies.  During the height of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, India and China engaged in a brief one-month conflict in 
which the Indian military was routed, and China gained free reign over the Himalayan region 
near the Chinese-Indian-Tibetan border, seizing the Aksai-Chin region of India.  The 
administration was concerned that China might attack India, a major American ally, a second 
time.  The poor performance of the Indian military during the first conflict left the administration 
doubting India could resist a determined attack from China.  In May, 1963, the NSC discussed 
how the administration would respond should China attack India again.  McNamara was explicit 
in his belief that not only were nuclear weapons required to defend India, but that nuclear 
weapons were preferred over non-nuclear options when defending India, particularly over 
sending US troops into the Himalayan region.  Kennedy, while not expressing agreement or 
disagreement with McNamara, stated that the United States could not allow India to suffer 
another defeat at the hands of the Chinese.278 
Control of the White House may have changed hands and parties, but American policy 
toward China remained relatively unchanged.  The reasons can be traced to the controlling 
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variables rather than the personalities determining policy.  Containment policy, the American 
commitment to defend Taiwan, the belief that the Soviet Union would not interfere, Chinese 
hostility toward the US, the all-important perception of the role of prestige in international affairs 
and domestic anti-communism all combined to drive Kennedy to continue the United States’ 
policy of confronting Communist China. 
Continuing the policy of confrontation meant facing the same issues as before.  Much 
like the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration found itself mired in the 
offshores islands, the result of Chiang’s refusal to abandon the islands, the formal agreement to 
defend Taiwan and the risk to American prestige amongst the Asian nations and American allies 
should the offshore islands, or Taiwan, fall to China.  The administration may have constructed a 
contingency plan to disengage from the offshores, but the political costs of losing the offshores, 
much less Taiwan, were deemed too high.   Kennedy’s public statements in the summer of 1962 
left no doubt that the United States associated the offshore islands with the political status of 
Taiwan. 
Though Kennedy never faced a situation like the Korean War, or a Taiwan Straits crisis 
in confronting China, he still utilized tactical nuclear weapons in considering his military 
options.  The administration’s considerations were inconsistent and belied the initial push by the 
administration to limit US dependence on tactical nuclear weapons.  When the administration did 
perceive a threat to the offshore islands, tactical nuclear weapons played a much more reduced 
role than they did during the previous two crises.  In 1958, the movement of PLAAF fighters 
sparked an aggressive response in nuclear preparations by the US military.  In 1962, however, 
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the movement of PLA troops brought no direct military preparations, though such action was 
discussed. 
Throughout 1962, and into early 1963, the administration considered a pre-emptive act of 
war using tactical nuclear weapons in an effort to deprive the Chinese of their own nuclear 
weapons.  This marked a significant departure from the nuclear planning of Eisenhower and 
Truman.  Given the considerable damage to American Asian policy should the Chinese gain 
nuclear weapons, it becomes understandable why Kennedy would consider some of the more 
extreme measures.  Failing that, the administration pursued the Limited Test Ban Treaty in an 
attempt to bring international pressure against China to stop development of nuclear weapons.  
Cooperating with the Soviet Union on the LTBT also played into the American policy of 
exploiting the rift in the Sino-Soviet alliance.  Yet China remained independent of the Soviet 
Union on nuclear weapons issues, and Kennedy knew this.  The harsh reality for Kennedy was 
that the only way to stop the Chinese from obtaining nuclear weapons was to use military 
force.279  Like the presidents before him, Kennedy was not willing to risk the international 
consequences of unilateral action with nuclear weapons, and refrained from using them against 
the Chinese nuclear weapons program. 
While McNamara may have intended to significantly alter US reliance on tactical nuclear 
weapons, in the end, the Kennedy Administration continued the policy of the Eisenhower 
Administration.  Gaddis has argued that Kennedy relied less on nuclear weapons for crisis 
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management though he was much more willing to use them when compared to Eisenhower.  
Kennedy tended to focus on how to conduct war rather than focus on war avoidance, as was the 
case during the Eisenhower Administration.280 
In choosing to confront China, the Kennedy Administration had to consider all options 
for all possible contingencies.  Tactical nuclear weapons were the one component of Kennedy 
policy that allowed the United States to maintain its commitment to defend Taiwan and the 
offshore islands in the face of direct Chinese attack, though this was not apparent to the 
administration in 1961.  In creating the first contingency plan for defending the islands, 
McNamara focused on non-nuclear responses should China attempt to force the offshores issue.  
By 1962, though, McNamara was inquiring at what point the US would be required to utilize 
nuclear weapons to defend the islands.  The answer was only if China made a determined effort 
to take the islands.  Tactical nuclear weapons allowed the US to cover this scenario and thus 
allow the United States to guarantee its commitment to Taiwan. 
 McNamara may not have wholly changed his position in 1962 when he inquired about 
the necessity of using nuclear weapons to defend the offshore islands, but, by May, 1963, he had 
had reversed his position and embraced the use of nuclear weapons as a means of response to 
China.  In considering US reactions to a Chinese attack on India, McNamara turned first to using 
tactical nuclear weapons, rather than use a non-nuclear force.  Once again, tactical nuclear 
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weapons provided the only practical military means of defending India from a determined attack 
by China. 
The Chinese nuclear weapons program may not have been a threat to US national 
security, but it did, in a number of ways, upset the strategic balance in Asia.  The Asian reaction 
to a nuclear-armed China, calling for a nuclear free Asia, would have deprived the United States 
of its greatest military advantage in confronting China, tactical nuclear weapons.  Other 
consequences included an expensive increase in reliance on non-nuclear forces, American allies 
could ask for its own nuclear weapons, adding further to the danger of escalating any future 
crisis.  Even worse for the United States, Asian nations could become more accommodating to 
China, and less accommodating to the United States.  A nuclear-armed China would certainly be 
admitted to the United Nations, on its own terms.  These political and military costs elevated 
stopping the Chinese nuclear program to a high priority in the Kennedy Administration. 
The Kennedy Administration struggled to find a means to stop the Chinese nuclear 
program.  Using tactical nuclear weapons provided the best assurance of delaying the program, 
but no action, no matter the size or scope, would prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons.  
The administration clearly recognized the political liability of using nuclear weapons in an 
unprovoked act of war on China.  By having the Soviets destroy Chinese nuclear research 
facilities, or at least cooperate in such an operation, Kennedy could avoid the political cost of 
nuclear use, yet still obtain the benefits of delaying the Chinese program.  When the Soviets 
refused to cooperate, the administration still considered, though ultimately rejected, the option of 





In the years between June 1950 and May 1963, the United States repeatedly considered 
the option of utilizing nuclear weapons against Communist China.  For the majority of these 
years, tactical nuclear weapons were the prevalent choice for exercising American military 
strength on the Asian continent.  There were two dominating factors that steered American 
military policy toward considering the use of nuclear weapons against China.  First, the 
perception that China had to be confronted aggressively in order to preserve American prestige 
as a world power, and use that prestige to prevent the expansion of communism in Asia.  Second, 
the belief that only tactical nuclear weapons would allow the United States military to 
successfully restrain China on the Asian continent in the event of conflict. 
Many historians recognize the importance of prestige in American policy, but link it to 
strategic nuclear policy, arguing that all nuclear weapons were used in the context of deterrence 
policies designed to prevent a China from conducting actions against US interests.  Thomas 
Christensen, for example, argues that by incorporating nuclear weapons into a deterrence policy 
overemphasized the importance of the role of prestige, forcing the US to adopt an aggressive 
nuclear stance, lest deterrence be undermined.281  The use of tactical nuclear weapons fits cleanly 
into coercive diplomacy model put forth by Abram Shulsky, which identifies the need for using 
the display or threat of excessive force to obtain concessions from an opposing government.282 
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It is clear from the research that there was a shared belief amongst the three 
administrations addressed in this study that prestige and the appearance of weakness, mainly by 
inaction or accommodation, would encourage Chinese aggression against American interests in 
Asia.  This belief led Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy to pursue policies intended to show 
American strength and confront China in an effort to prevent future conflict, essentially a policy 
of deterrence.  Once it had been determined that the United States had to adopt an aggressive 
stance toward China, the military component of US policy assumed a greater role than economic 
or diplomatic efforts.  With an increased role in China policy, the presidents and the military 
relied on the most efficient weapons system in the US arsenal, tactical nuclear weapons. 
Prestige as a variable of policy played different roles at different times.  Under Truman, 
the lack of tactical capability threatened the deterrent value of the American nuclear stockpile.  
The inability to successfully execute tactical nuclear warfare in Korea was perceived to be 
damaging to the reputation of the American ability to retaliate.  This risk of damaging US 
prestige served as a restraining influence against United States’ nuclear policy in Korea.283  
When tactical nuclear weapons became abundant in numbers and capability, the role of prestige 
reversed.  Eisenhower and Kennedy changed from restraining nuclear policy out of fear of 
damaging the United States’ nuclear reputation, to that of employing nuclear aggression as the 
only means of obtaining American military goals and thus protecting the reputation of the United 
States as a reliable ally. 
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The viewpoint of most historians does not take into account a separate role for tactical 
nuclear weapons, yet two of the three presidents in this study clearly identified a distinct and 
separate role for tactical nuclear weapons within American China Policy.  Tactical nuclear 
weapons allowed the United States to employee the utility of nuclear weapons within a limited 
war scenario without incurring the risk of general war.  The application of the doctrine of tactical 
nuclear warfare manifested itself in American China policy during the post-Korean War planning 
and the Taiwan Straits crises, when the United States relied exclusively on tactical weapons to 
ensure military objectives.  The Truman Administration is unique in that the technology of 
tactical nuclear weapons had not advanced enough to allow them to be considered to use in 
American policy.  Nevertheless, Truman still sought to use nuclear weapons, first by using 
strategic weapons as tactical weapons, then by using nuclear weapons in a bluff maneuver for 
coercive diplomacy to force China to the bargaining table during the Korean War. 
The alternatives to reliance on tactical nuclear weapons contained too high a political cost 
for the United States.  Disengaging from the defense of South Korea or the offshore islands 
damaged the perception of the United States as an ally and questioned the American commitment 
to its Asian allies.  Conventional military operations risked unacceptably large numbers of 
American casualties over a lengthy conflict and the domestic backlash such a military endeavor 
would entail.  Using strategic nuclear weapons contained the high risk of escalating a limited war 
to general war with the Soviet Union.  Without tactical nuclear weapons, American policy could 
not incorporate the defense of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan or the offshore islands into the 
American sphere of influence in the Pacific. 
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The dynamic of the US policy hinging on China as a non-nuclear power ended on three 
o’clock in the afternoon, on October 16, 1964, when China detonated its first atomic bomb.284  
Kennedy’s fears that China would be immediately admitted to the United Nations were 
unfounded, as it took another seven years before the People’s Republic of China would displace 
the Republic of China as a member.285  The belief that the international community could 
somehow control China’s nuclear ambitions was also unfounded, as China has not fully 
participated in most major nuclear non-proliferation treaties and even assisted Pakistan in 
obtaining nuclear weapons.  In a policy similar to American efforts to deprive China of nuclear 
weapons, China has participated in diplomatic efforts to keep North Korea from obtaining 
nuclear weapons.286 
After the Kennedy Administration, tactical nuclear weapons as a method of policy 
against China declined in consideration.  During the administration of Richard Nixon, the 
president considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, but only in the context of 
coercive diplomacy aimed at North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.  Similar to Truman’s 
Operation Hudson Harbor, Nixon’s threat was a bluff that produced unintended results.  China, 
which was not the target of the threats, still reacted by placing its military on alert.287 
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Tactical weapons themselves ceased to be a part of the active US inventory after 1992, 
when President George H.W. Bush ordered the tactical stockpile withdrawn from service.288  The 
reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in China policy continues to this day.  Current military 
policy has adopted a far less confrontational stance than that of the 1950s and now seeks 
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